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DOES HISTORY DEFEAT STANDING
DOCTRINE?
Ann Woo/handler* & Caleb Nelson**

According to the Supreme Court, the Federal Constitution limits
not only the types of matters that federal courts can adjudicate, but
also the parties who can bring those matters before them. In
particular, the Court has held that private citizens who have suffered
no concrete private injury lack standing to ask federal courts to
redress diffuse harms to the public at large.1 When such harms are
justiciable at all, the proper party plaintiff is the public itself,
represented by an authorized officer of the government.
Although the Court claims historical support for these ideas,
academic critics insist that the law of standing is a recent "invention"
of federal judges.2 Indeed, it is frequently said that " [t]here was no
doctrine of standing prior to the middle of the twentieth century."3
According to this view, the forms of action did much of the work of
standing, defining when a plaintiff had the type of injury that, together
with the defendant's breach of duty, would support a claim for relief.
But judges did not otherwise inquire into standing; a court would deal
with standing-related concerns simply by asking "whether the matter
before it fit one of the recognized forms of action."4 Only in the
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1. See, e.g. , Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); cf Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (holding that Congress can authorize private suits for
harms that are widely shared, but only if each individual plaintiff's harm is sufficiently
concrete to qualify as an "injury in fact").
2. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article Ill , 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, What's Standing After
Lujan?]; see also, e.g. , John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1009 (2002) (asserting
that the Supreme Court "fabricat[ed] the doctrineO of standing" in the twentieth century).
3. Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 1009.
4. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1395 (1988) [hereinafter Winter, The Metaphor]; see also Edward A.
Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing
Doctrine ls Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2251-52 &
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twentieth century, so the story goes, did a "distinctive body of standing
doctrine" develop.5
For the Supreme Court's detractors, this claim has an important
corollary. If the dominant view of justiciability from the Framing until
the mid-twentieth century focused only on whether claims fit into the
forms recognized by law and did not entail any separate notion of
standing, then it more easily follows that the modern Court should not
read standing doctrine into the Federal Constitution. According to
widely accepted academic critiques, the Court is flatly wrong to claim
historical support for a constitutional requirement of standing, and
particularly for the requirement that private parties show some sort of
individualized injury before they can proceed in federal court.6
Building on prior work by Louis Jaffe and Raoul Berger,7 an
impressive article by Steven Winter suggests that the principle of
public control over public rights has only recently become dogma, and
that earlier eras saw no constitutional objections to "the adjudication
of group rights at the behest of any member of the public, without
regard to the necessity of personal interest, injury, or standing."8 Cass

n.63 (1999) (citing the many scholars who have suggested that "the question of standing is
best treated as a question indistinguishable from whether the party has a right of action").
5. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1432, 1434 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law]; see
also Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1395 (asserting that what Professor Winter calls
"the syllogism of the forms," under which courts simply asked whether parties were
presenting their claims in the form prescribed by positive law, "predominated until the
middle of the twentieth century").
6. Compare Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-04 & n.5 (1998)
(indicating that history supports the "triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability"
that "constitutes the core of Article Ill's case-or-controversy requirement"), with, e.g.,
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 1004 ("[N]o one seriously believes that the Framers
chose [the words 'cases' and 'controversies'] with anything like the Supreme Court's
doctrinal framework in mind or that the Court's justiciability rulings are anything other than
a judicially invented gloss on the Constitution.").
7. See Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 818, 840 (1969) (arguing that "historically-derived
constitutional compulsions" do not support "objections to the standing of a private
individual to enforce a 'public right' "); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public
Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1033-34
(1968) (arguing that "whether the analysis proceeds in terms of history, logic or policy," the
constitutional requirement of a "Case" does not require "a plaintiff who proffers for judicial
determination a question concerning his own legal status"); cf Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to
Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1275 (1961) (conceding that
some early American decisions were "antagonistic to citizen actions," but reading both
English history and the evolution of American tradition to support some such actions).
8. Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1381-82; see also id. at 1374 (asserting that
there was no conception of standing as a component of a constitutional case before the
twentieth century); Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the
Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 315 (2001) (noting with disapproval
"[t]he Supreme Court's constitutionalization of standing doctrine over the past three
decades" (footnote omitted)).
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Sunstein similarly condemns the twentieth-century Supreme Court for
importing what he calls "a private-law model of standing" into the
Constitution.9 Drawing primarily upon mandamus practice and qui
tam statutes, the critics treat history as firmly establishing the
constitutionality of "the 'standingless' public action or 'private
attorney general' model that modern standing law is designed to
thwart. "10
This Article sees the history differently. We do not claim that
history compels acceptance of the modern Supreme Court's vision of
standing, or that the constitutional nature of standing doctrine was
crystal clear from the moment of the Founding on. The subsistence of
qui tam actions alone might be enough to refute any such suggestion.
We do, however, argue that history does not defeat standing doctrine;
the notion of standing is not an innovation, and its
constitutionalization does not contradict a settled historical consensus
about the Constitution's meaning.
To begin with, there was an active law of standing in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To be sure, early American
courts did not use the term "standing" much, and modern research
tools might therefore convince one that the concept did not exist.11 But
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century courts were well aware of the need
for proper parties, and they linked that issue to the distinction
between public and private rights. Courts regularly designated some
areas of litigation as being under public control and others as being
under private control. Within the area of private control, moreover,
courts paid close attention to whether the correct private parties were
before them.
It is certainly true, as William Fletcher and other commentators
have noted, that standing requirements often can be rephrased in

9. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, supra note 5, at 1433 ("While
the model is often justified by reference to the case or controversy requirement of article III,
there is in fact no basis in that article or in any other provision of the Constitution for the
view that the private-law model is constitutional in status."); see also id. at 1434-35 (claiming
that the requirement of a private-law injury in public-law actions arose in the early
regulatory era); Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 170-71 (asserting
that practice "from the founding era to roughly 1920" provides "no evidence of
constitutional limits on [Congress's] power to grant standing"). Professor Sunstein
distinguishes between the need for a private cause of action (which he does view as a
constitutional requirement for private litigation) and the need for a private injury (which he
does not view as a constitutional requirement). See, e.g. , Cass R. Sunstein, Informational
Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 639
(1999) ("As a matter of text and history, the best reading of the Constitution is that no one
can sue without some kind of cause of action.").
10. Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1396.
11. See, e.g. , Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 169 & n.26
(reporting the results of a LEXIS search for the word "standing," though acknowledging
that this evidence is "crude").
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terms of the elements of a cause of action.12 But the issue of the proper
parties to allege public and private injuries cut across various causes of
action, and it also limited the arguments available even to people with
valid causes of action. Because English precedents were mixed,
moreover, American courts that resolved this issue were not always
simply following well-established forms. In favoring a private-injury
requirement for private litigation, their decisions were influenced by
American ideas about the proper role of the judiciary, its relationship
to the political branches of the state and federal governments, and the
legitimate allocations of public and private power.
Contrary to the claims of modern critics, moreover, the nineteenth
century Supreme Court did see a constitutional dimension to standing
doctrine. Admittedly, early cases often did not specify the extent to
which standing doctrine was simply a matter of "general law" and the
extent to which the Federal Constitution incorporated it. But in the
cases dearest to the hearts of the standing critics - actions against
federal and state governmental officials - the nineteenth-century
Court explicitly discussed standing in constitutional terms. The Court's
language, moreover, did not suggest that the constitutional issue
would always vanish if only a legislature would give the plaintiff a
statutory right to sue. Rather, with the exception of qui tam (which we
discuss more thoroughly below), such indications as there were
suggested that a legislatively created cause of action would not
necessarily be enough for standing.
Part I discusses some general manifestations of judicial concern for
maintaining the distinctions between proper litigants of public and
private rights. Part II shows that the Supreme Court saw these
distinctions as having constitutional dimensions. Part III discusses
whether the constitutional concerns would evanesce with
congressional provision for a cause of action.

12. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223, 229
(1988) (stating that a standing decision determines whether the plaintiff has a right to
judicial relief in a federal court and should be seen as addressing the substantive merits of
the plaintiff's claim); Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An
Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974) (arguing that standing
issues would better be addressed by asking whether the plaintiff has stated a claim for relief).
We do not take issue with Judge Fletcher's point that standing doctrine should be sensitive
"to the particular right at issue and to the proper definition of the plaintiff class for that
right." Fletcher, supra, at 249. In certain circumstances, however, we suggest that "proper
definition of the plaintiff class" may exclude private litigants altogether, even when Congress
has purported to make them proper plaintiffs. Cf id. at 224 (arguing for unfettered
congressional power to create standing to litigate statutory rights, though recognizing
restrictions on Congress's power to create standing to litigate constitutional rights).
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THE "GENERAL L AW" OF ST ANDING

The Traditional Distinction Between Public and Private Rights

Because much of the traditional discourse about standing was cast
in terms of the distinction between "public rights" and "private
rights," we start with some working definitions of these concepts.
These definitions are based on historically recognized categories, but
also have modern currency.
Public rights are those that belong to the body politic.13 They may
include interests generally shared, such as those in the free navigation
of waterways, passage on public highways, and general compliance
with regulatory law.14 The penal law (which includes not only criminal
law but also fines and forfeitures recoverable through civil process)
also defines various public rights.15 The penalties for violations of
those rights are not measured strictly by private loss; like public law
more generally, penal law focuses on vindicating the claims of the
public rather than on compensating individuals.16
Private rights, by contrast, are held by discrete individuals. Rights
at the core of this category include an individual's common law rights
in property and bodily integrity, as well as in enforcing contracts.
While penal law also is concerned with invasions of private property
and person, private rights may generally be distinguished by private
law's focus on individual compensation (or the avoidance of private
loss by injunctive remedies).
13. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 (discussing "the public
rights and duties, due to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social
aggregate capacity"); Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 21 (N.Y. 1829) (Walworth, C. )
(distinguishing between "public rights belonging to the people at large" and "the private
unalienable rights of each individual").
14. See Lansing, 4 Wend. at 21 (Walworth, C.) (describing "[t]he right to navigate the
public waters of the State and to fish therein, and the right to use the public highways" as
public rights held by the people at large rather than by any individual citizen).
15. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 (characterizing crimes and
misdemeanors as public law).
16. See, e.g. , id. at *7 (noting that the law strives not only to "redress the party injured"
by unlawful acts, in the manner described in Blackstone's volume on "private wrongs," but
also "to secure to the public the benefit of society, by preventing or punishing every breach
and violation of those laws, which the sovereign power has thought proper to establish, for
the government and tranquility of the whole"); see also Richard A. Epstein, Crime and Tort,
Old Wine in New Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND
THE LEGAL PROCESS 233 (Randy Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1978) (arguing that the
defining line between tort and crime is that the former decides as between two parties who
should bear a loss); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1975) (stating that private enforcement occurs where detection
is near 100%, whereas public enforcement tends to be in areas where detection is less certain
and where penalties are set not merely to measure loss but also to make up for incomplete
detection).
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Of course, legislatures have considerable power to create new
rights and to redefine existing rights in ways that affect whether they
are public or private. Legislatures may add to public law by enacting
new regulatory and criminal statutes, to be enforced by governmental
officials. Similarly, legislatures may create statutory duties or
"entitlements"17 owed to private persons; these entitlements can be
treated as private rights for standing purposes, and the legislature may
permit individuals to seek compensation for losses caused by their
breach.18 In connection with a claim for private compensation,
individuals may also be accorded the ability to collect
supracompensatory penalties such as treble damages, even though
these awards concededly have "penal" or public aspects.19
Still, legislatures do not have total control over the line between
public and private rights. Both state and federal constitutions limit the
legislature's ability to assert public control over certain kinds of core
private rights. Conversely, there are also constitutional constraints on
privatizing certain core public rights.
B.

Standing and the PublidPrivate Distinction

The question of which parties may properly come to court to
vindicate these different kinds of legal rights is central to the issue of
standing. In trying to address that question, American courts have
traditionally drawn partly upon general principles of jurisprudence
and partly upon distinctively American ideas about popular
sovereignty, limited government, and the separation of powers. To the
extent that these ideas played out differently in different jurisdictions,
we will focus on the practices of the federal courts. But it is worth
noting at the outset the ubiquity of the twin ideas of public control
over public rights and private control over private rights.

17. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV.
885, 963-64, 987-88 (2000) (describing a category of property interests or entitlements that
are protected by procedural due process but that are more easily subject to legislative
divestiture than ownership interests).
18. See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 676 (1892) (reasoning that a statute
making corporate officers liable for corporate debt if they signed a false certificate of capital
stock created a private right "as it gives a civil remedy, at the private suit of the creditor
only, and measured by the amount of the debt, it is as to him clearly remedial").
19. See, e.g., ISAAC 'ESPINASSE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ACTIONS ON PENAL
STATUTES, IN GENERAL 3 (photo. reprint 2003) (1st Am. ed. 1822) (noting that statutes
authorizing injured parties to recover treble damages are "usually termed remedial," but
acknowledging that they "are . . . in some respects penal; for the sum recovered in actions
under them is not generally confined to what amounts to actual amends, but goes much
beyond it, and operates as a penalty against the party who has broken the statute"); see also
Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as
Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003) (discussing
competing conceptions of punitive damages in the nineteenth century).
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Critics of modern standing doctrine maintain that in the early
Republic, "American law provided several constitutionally acceptable
models for the adjudication of group rights at the behest of any
member of the public. . . . "20 To the extent that these alternative
models existed, however, they were areas of contest. As a general
matter, moreover, the requirements of public control over public
rights and private control over private rights predominated in
American law.
1.

Standing to Seek Criminal Punishment

An insightful recent article by Edward Hartnett provides a
straightforward argument against the Supreme Court's attempt to
read a requirement of private injury into the language of Article III.
As Professor Hartnett notes, criminal prosecutions brought by the
United States are universally acknowledged to be "Cases" within the
meaning of Article III. But federal crimes usually do not inflict any
particularized injury upon the United States. For Hartnett, it follows
that "the word 'case' in Article III cannot reasonably be understood to
require a personal, concrete, and particularized injury in fact."21
This argument, however, is subject to an objection. The concept of
proper parties is central to standing doctrine, and it may also infuse
notions of a "Case." In particular, the requirements for a "Case" may
be party-specific: just as a private plaintiff who has suffered an
individual injury may be able to bring a "Case" against a defendant
while other private parties cannot, so too invasions of public rights
that cause diffuse injuries to the general public might support a "Case"
between the public and the malefactor but not between any single
individual and the malefactor. The fact that public officers can bring
criminal prosecutions, then, does not disprove the hypothesis that
federal courts can entertain private litigation only when private rights
of a certain sort are at stake.
Americans of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were used to
distinguishing between wrongs to private individuals and wrongs to
the public at large. What distinguished crimes and misdemeanors from
mere civil wrongs was that they "are a breach and violation of public
rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a
community."22 Thus, most early state constitutions affirmatively
20. Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1381.
21. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 2249-50. While Professor Hartnett agrees with Professor
Sunstein and other critics of standing doctrine about Article III, he reserves judgment about
the circumstances in which congressional attempts to authorize "citizen suits" might impinge
upon powers that Article II gives to the President. See id. at 2256-62.
22. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2; see also, e.g., State v. Rickey, 9
N.J.L. 293, 305 (1827) (Ford, J.) ("The principles of the common law have clearly
distinguished between public and private wrongs from the earliest ages to the present
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required each indictment to specify that the defendant's conduct had
been "against the peace and dignity of the State."23
To be sure, much criminal behavior violated an individual victim's
private rights as well as the rights of the public at large.24 But criminal
law enforcement was conceptualized as vindicating a shared public
interest in the overall protection of private rights rather than any
single individual's private rights themselves. As a result, criminal
behavior potentially gave rise to two separate kinds of actions - the
individual victim's tort action for compensation (generated by the
behavior's invasion of the victim's private rights) and the public's
criminal action for punishment (generated by the behavior's invasion
of the community's public rights).
Even in England, where the public/private distinction lacked the
full force that it acquired in America,25 people had long understood
the tort action to be under private control and the criminal action to
be under public control. Writing about the state of nature, Locke
asserted that crimes against the law of nature gave rise to "two distinct
rights" - the right of "punishing the crime" for the sake of deterring
similar conduct and the right of "taking reparation" for the individual
damage caused by the crime.26 According to Locke, everybody in the
state of nature enjoyed the right of punishment (because "in the state
·

time."); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91, 94 (Pa. 1815) (argument of
counsel) ("That the Courts have invariably preserved this distinction, between those cases
which affect individuals only, and those which affect the public, will appear from a great
number of cases which might be adduced . . . . ").
23. See DEL CONST. of 1792, art. VI, § 21; Mo . CONST. of 1776, art. LVII; N.H. CONST.
of 1784, pt. II; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XV; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. :XXXVI; PA. CONST.
of 1790, art. V, § 12; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 2; VA. CONST. of 1776; cf 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *268 ("All [criminal] offences are either against the king's
peace, or his crown and dignity; and are so laid in every indictment. ").
24. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 ("[E]very public offense is also a
private wrong, and somewhat more; it affects the individual, and it likewise affects the
community."). To a large extent, indeed, criminal law protected the same interests as private
law; a crime's violation of the public rights lay in its tendency, if not punished, to set a
"public evil example" encouraging other malefactors to steal private property or otherwise
to invade private rights. See Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle at 94 (argument of counsel)
(emphasis omitted).
25. Part of the conceptual blurring of the public/private distinction in England may have
stemmed from the king's dual role as both individual and sovereign. Consider, for instance,
Blackstone's explanation of why the king was "in all cases the proper prosecutor for every
public offense": because "the majesty of the whole community" was centered in the king, the
law supposed the king to be "injured by every infraction of the public rights belonging to
that community." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. This explanation, which
effectively equated wrongs to the public at large with wrongs to the person of the king, had
no counterpart in postrevolutionary America, where people saw no need to treat any
particular individual as the embodiment of the public.
26. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT§ 1 1 (6th ed. 1764),
reprinted in THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION (J.W. Gough ed., Macmillan Co. 1947).
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of nature every one has the executive power of the law of nature"),27
but "the [right] of taking reparation . . . belongs only to the injured
party."28 For Locke, this distinction persisted after the formation of
civil society. Of course, individual citizens no longer enjoyed executive
power; the "common right of punishing" was instead put into the
hands of the public magistrate. Being in charge of this common right,
"the magistrate . . . can often . . . remit the punishment of criminal
offences by his own authority."29 No public officer, however, could
"remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has
received"; compensation for such private injuries was something that
"he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own
name, and he alone can remit."30
Postrevolutionary Americans embraced this basic distinction. As
John Marshall noted in 1800, "A private suit instituted by an
individual, asserting his claim to property, can only be controlled by
that individual. The executive can give no direction concerning it. But
a public prosecution carried on in the name of the United States, can
without impropriety be dismissed at the will of the govemment."31
Throughout the United States, criminal prosecutions were
conducted in the name and under the authority of the people in their
collective capacity,32 and the legal rights that they vindicated were
understood to be those of the public rather than of any private
individual.33 In keeping with this view, rules of evidence that excluded
the testimony of interested witnesses were not understood to prevent
injured victims from testifying in criminal prosecutions; while victims
might have some personal axes to grind, they had no legally

27. Id. § 13.
28. Id. § 1 1 .
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Representative John Marshall, Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives,
of the United States, on the Resolutions of the Hon. Edward Livingston, Relative to Thomas
Nash, Alias Jonathan Robbins (March 7, 1800), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82,
99 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984).
32. Some early state constitutions explicitly provided that "[a]ll prosecutions shall be
carried on in the name and by the authority of the State." S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 2;
see also DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VI, § 21 ("Prosecutions shall be carried on in the name of
the state . . . . "); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. V, § 12 ("[A]ll prosecutions shall be carried on in
the name and by the authority of the commonwealth . . . . "). Even in states whose
constitutions did not explicitly impose this requirement, prosecutions were conducted in the
name of the state or its people.
33. See, e.g., Bryant v. Ela, 1 Smith 396, 413 (N.H. 1815) (observing that " [t]he State is
the party injured" by crimes); Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binn. 601, 606-07 (Pa. 1 809)
(Tilghman, C.J.) ("[T]he proceeding by indictment is not the right of the injured party, but of
the public.").
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cognizable interest in the vindication of public rights.34 For the same
reason, the Supreme Court held early on that the federal
government's prosecution of someone accused of attacking a Spanish
diplomat was not a "Case[] affecting . . . [a] public Minister" within the
meaning of the Federal Constitution's Original Jurisdiction Clause.35
As the Court explained, the case was entirely between the United
States and the defendant, and the minister "has no concern . . . in the
event of the prosecution" even though "he was the person injured by
the assault."36
It is theoretically possible, of course, for a legal system to view
criminal prosecutions as actions by the public to vindicate public rights
while simultaneously allowing victims or other private individuals to
conduct the prosecution on behalf of the public. That possibility is part
of the historical debate about standing.37 Under English practice,
although public officers remained in ultimate control of most criminal
prosecutions (through the king's ability to grant pardons and
Parliament's ability to enact statutes that effectively scuttled
prosecutions), private individuals had considerable authority to
initiate and prosecute criminal cases in the king's name.38 This practice
34. See, e.g. , State v. Rickey, 10 N.J.L. 83, 84 (1828) ("The idea that a private person
may be interested in a public prosecution, seems to be utterly discarded in law."); cf United
States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203, 210-13 (1842) (acknowledging that special rules of
law occasionally did give alleged victims a private interest in a successful prosecution, as
when the law "entitled [a robbery victim] to a restitution of his goods upon conviction of the
offender," but observing that even victims with such interests were often allowed to testify in
prosecutions aimed at "suppress[ing] . . . public crimes" rather than serving "the interest of
the party aggrieved").
35. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2.
36. United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467, 469 (1826).
37. Even today, some of the historical discussions of private prosecution are in service of
arguments favoring greater individual involvement (or at least victim involvement) in
prosecution. See, e.g., Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9
HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 357, 358 (1986); Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea
Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30
CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 586 (1984). See generally BRUCE L. BENSON, To SERVE AND
PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1998).
38. See, e.g. , Cardenas, supra note 37, at 360 ("The right of any crime victim to initiate
and conduct criminal proceedings was the paradigm of prosecution in England all the way up
to the middle of the Nineteenth Century."); PATRICK DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 20 (1958) (indicating that even police prosecutions were "in
theory" private prosecutions); cf Daniel Klerman, Settlement and the Decline of Private
Prosecution in Thirteenth-Century England, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (observing that
"by the mid-nineteenth century, most prosecutions were private in name only, as the
'private' prosecutor was in most instances a policeman," but adding that "Parliament did not
pass legislation to set up a national system of public prosecutors until 1879"); Philip B.
Kurland & D.W.M. Waters, Public Prosecutions in England, 1854-79: An Essay in English
Legislative History, 1959 DUKE L.J. 493, 497-99 (discussing the long-unsuccessful movement,
dating back to the late eighteenth century, that led up to the 1879 statute). Even the 1879
statute did not "establish[] a system of public prosecution similar to the one that exists in the
United States." Cardenas, supra note 37, at 363; see also Klerman, supra, at 8 ("It was only
with the passage of the 1985 Prosecution of Offenses Act that England established an
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made its way to the American colonies. Ultimately, however,
Americans rejected it.
Joan Jacoby claims that " [b)y the advent of the American
Revolution, private prosecution had been virtually eliminated in the
American colonies."39 This statement is something of an exaggeration;
some cities and states continued to give private individuals a
substantial role not only in pressing charges, but even in conducting
trials.40 But Jacoby is correct that a consensus was developing against
giving private individuals free rein to represent the public. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, for example, noted that
practice in England, where criminal trials ordinarily "are conducted by
counsel employed by the private prosecutor," was "entirely different"
from practice in Massachusetts, where the public attorney general was
in charge of all criminal prosecutions.41 Other courts also emphasized
this "striking and important difference in prosecutions for criminal
offences here and in England. "42
In explaining America's movement away from private
prosecutions, courts emphasized the dangers of putting public power
in the hands of private individuals who were neither selected by nor
responsible to the people at large. In the course of asserting that "no
indictment ought to be sent to the grand jury without the sanction and
approbation of the solicitor-general," Tennessee's highest court
highlighted the risk that "leaving prosecutions to every attorney who
will take a fee to prosecute" would permit "the innocent to be
oppressed or vexatiously harassed"; private prosecutors would not
effective system of public prosecution, and even this legislation preserved a limited right of
private prosecution.").
39. JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 19
(1980).
40. See, e.g., ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880, at 5 (1989) (describing the aldermen's courts of nineteenth
century Philadelphia, in which "private citizens brought criminal cases to the attention of
court officials, initiated the process of prosecution, and retained considerable control over
the ultimate disposition of cases"); Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky, The Rise of Guilty
Pleas: New York, 1800-1865, 22 J.L. & SoC'Y 443, 448-59 (1995) (noting that in New York
City during the first half of the nineteenth century, private prosecutors or complainants not
only initiated indictments but often were represented at trial by private counsel, who
operated with the assistance of the district attorney).
41. Commonwealth v. Tuck, 37 Mass. 356, 364-65 (1838).
42. State Treasurer v. Rice, 1 1 Vt. 339, 343 (1839). The Rice court explained:
In this state, prosecutions for offences before the county court, which has original and
exclusive jurisdiction of most offences, are conducted by a public officer appointed for
that purpose, and responsible for the manner in which he discharges his duty. In
England they are usually instituted and conducted by private prosecutors . . . .
Id. ; see also 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE§ 23, at 15 (Boston, Brown, Little & Co. 1866) ("In all the States of our Union,
and in the tribunals of the United States, criminal prosecutions are carried on by a public
officer, learned in the law, and chosen for this particular purpose.").
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necessarily "feel the responsibility imposed by the oath of the
solicitor-general(,] by his selection for the discharge of these duties,
(and] by the confidence of the public reposed in him."43 The Supreme
Court of Louisiana likewise worried that private prosecutions would
reflect "the promptings of envy, malice, and all uncharitableness."44
Even in states that continued for a time to permit private
prosecutions, courts expressed concern that such prosecutions "are
often commenced in very doubtful cases and for the most trivial
offences," simply "to vex and harass an opponent."45
While some states may have taken longer than others to follow the
general trend, the federal government put public officers in control of
prosecutions from the start. When the Judiciary Act of 1789 set up the
federal courts, it also required a federal district attorney to be
appointed for each of the thirteen j udicial districts, and it gave this
officer a "duty . . . to prosecute in such district all delinquents from
crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United
States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be
concerned. "46 Although private prosecutions occasionally occurred in
territorial courts and in the courts of the District of Columbia, Article
III courts were different: they did not recognize private citizens as the
proper people to prosecute public offenses.47 As the U.S. Supreme

43. Fout v. State, 4 Tenn. 98, 98-99 (1816). The court went on to cast the role of the
publicly appointed prosecutor in constitutional terms: "The designs of the [state]
constitution are disappointed by suffering the interference of any other . . . . " Id. at 99.
44. Markham v. Close, 2 La. 581, 587 (1831) (rebuffing a private individual's attempt to
appear as public prosecutor, and invoking various considerations "which induce[] the state
to take the prosecution of offences against her peace and her dignity into her own hands,
and forbid(] the interference of private passions with the vindication of her justice").
45. Waldron v. Tuttle, 4 N.H. 149, 151 (1827).
46. Judiciary Act of 1789,§ 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
47. See, e.g., United States v. McAvoy, 26 F. Cas. 1044, 1045-46 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860)
(No. 15,654). The McAvoy court wrote:
[T]here is no power conferred, by statute or usage, on the courts of the United States,
to recognize a suit, civil or criminal, as legally before them, in the name of the United
States, unless it is instituted and prosecuted by a district attorney legally appointed and
commissioned conformably to the (Judiciary Act of 1789].
Id.; see also Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 293-96 (1989) (noting that after ratification of
the Constitution, private individuals occasionally "helped initiate prosecutions (in federal
court] by contacting the grand jury," but conceding that "they did not control the
prosecutions once begun"); cf Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 992, 994 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872)
(No. 18,255) (Field, J.) ("You will not allow private prosecutors to intrude themselves into
your presence, and present accusations. Generally such parties are actuated by private
enmity, and seek merely the gratification of their personal malice.").
Qui tam statutes, which we discuss in Part III, may mark a limited exception to the idea
that only public officers could bring criminal prosecutions to court in the name of the United
States. Although most qui tam suits proceeded as civil actions in debt, common law practice
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Court put it in 1842, "from the very nature of an indictment and the
sentence thereon, the government alone has the right to control the
whole proceedings and execution of the sentence."48 At least when it
came to criminal prosecutions, then, private individuals were not
understood to be able to go to federal court to vindicate public rights,
whether on their own behalf or in the name of the American people
at large.
2.

Standing to Seek Civil Remedies for the Invasion ofPublic Rights

Even civil remedies for violations of public rights were not
generally available at the behest of private plaintiffs, at least in the
absence of some connection to a private injury.49 The law of "public
nuisances" - a catch-all term for various invasions of public rights,
ranging from corruption of public morals to obstruction of public
highways50 - illustrates the point. Public authorities could get courts
involved in suppressing such nuisances, either by imposing criminal
punishments on those responsible51 or by issuing injunctions against
ongoing violations of the public rights.52 But private individuals were
much more limited in their ability to seek judicial relief for public
nuisances. From Independence on, American courts enforced the
"familiar" principle that " [t]he public authorities alone can complain
of nuisances, while they remain public or general."53 Indeed, courts

traditionally gave the relator the option of proceeding instead by the criminal process of
information.
48. United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203, 209 (1842).
49. When a private plaintiff had suffered private injury, he might be able to bring a
claim that had aspects of a public right. For example, parties with private injuries could often
seek statutory penalties or punitive damages that exceeded their actual loss and that may
have been designed at least in part to protect society as a whole from future wrongdoing.
50. See, e.g., H.G. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN
THEIR VARIOUS FORMS; INCLUDING REMEDIES THEREFOR AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 22
(Albany, Jon D. Parsons, Jr. 1875) ("Public nuisances, strictly, are such as result from the
violation of public rights, and producing no special injury to one more than another of the
people, may be said to have a common effect, and to produce a common damage."); F.H.
Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 LAW Q. REV. 480, 482 (1949) (referring to "public
nuisance" as "that wide term which came to include obstructed highways, lotteries,
unlicensed stage-plays, common scolds, and a host of other rag ends of the law"), quoted in
William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 998 (1966).
51. See, e.g. , William L. Prosser, Private A ction for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997,
999 (1966) (noting that " [p]ublic nuisance was a common-law crime" and that states also
enacted statutes authorizing criminal punishments for various kinds of public nuisances).
52. See, e.g., Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 98
(1838) (noting that "a court of equity may take jurisdiction in cases of public nuisance, by an
information filed by the attorney general").
53. Seeley v. Bishop, 19 Conn. 128, 135 (1848); see also, e.g., Harrison v. Sterett, 4 H. &
McH. 540, 548 (Md. Prov. Ct. 1774) (argument of counsel) ("[P]ublic wrongs being a general
injury to the community, are to be redressed and punished by a public prosecution . . . . ).
"
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portrayed this rule as simply one manifestation of a broader idea:
"Upon general principles, that common interest, which belongs
equally to all, and in which the parties suing have no special or
peculiar property, will not maintain a suit."54
Commentators offered various explanations of this principle. Coke
stressed the need for "avoiding of multiplicity of suites."55 Blackstone
elaborated upon the same theme, observing that it is much less harsh
to subject defendants to a single proceeding by public authorities than
to permit "every subject in the kingdom . . . to harass the offender with
separate actions."56 American jurists added that in cases about injuries
that were common to all, courts should "look to the rights of the
whole community, and not . . . those of a single individual"; the rule
that " [f]or such an injury it is for the government to interfere, and not
a private individual," therefore brought the proper parties into court.57
It did not follow that private plaintiffs could never seek judicial
relief from damage caused by a public nuisance. When the
maintenance of a public nuisance caused a particular individual to
sustain "special damage" - "an injury different in kind from that of
which the public complains" - he could bring an action at law against
the person responsible for the nuisance.58 If the nuisance was ongoing
and threatened to cause him damage that was not merely "special" but
irreparable, he often could also seek an injunction from a court sitting
in equity. But it was well established, both at law and in equity, that
"an action will not lie in respect of a public nuisance, unless the
plaintiff has sustained a particular damage from it, and one not
common to the public generally."5 9 Whether the plaintiff had stated
such a private injury was a frequent matter of contest. 6()
54. Barr v. Stevens, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 292, 293 (1808).
55. 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
56a (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1853) (1628).
56. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *219.
57. O'Brien v. Norwich & W. R.R. Co., 17 Conn. 372, 376 (1845).
58. Commonwealth v. Webb, 27 Va. 726, 729 (Gen. Ct. 1828); see also, e.g. , Smith v. City
of Boston, 61 Mass. 254, 255 (1851) (noting that a private plaintiff may seek compensation
for damage caused by a public nuisance only if the damage is "peculiar and special" rather
than being "common to the public").
59. Bigelow v. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 565, 578 (1842) (adding that "the very
object of all suits, both at law and in equity," is "[t]o preserve and enforce the rights of
persons, as individuals, and not as members of the community at large"); see also, e.g. , Barr,
4 Ky. (1 Bibb) at 293 ("[A] public nuisance is not the subject of a suit by a private individual,
unless he has sustained some special injury thereby."); Harrison v. Sterett, 4 H. & McH. 540,
548 (Md. Prov. Ct. 1774) (argument of counsel) ("[A]n action will not lie for a public
nuisance without special damage . . . . "); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 16 Serg. & Rawle
390, 397 (Pa. 1827) ("In the case of a public nuisance, no one can support a private action,
unless for some special grievance or injury . . . . ") ; Webb, 27 Va. at 729 (stating the "rule of
Law, which we find no where contradicted, that no private action can be maintained for a
public nuisance, without special damage done to the party complaining"); cf 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *219-20 (observing that "no person . . . can have an action
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To be sure, when a public nuisance was threatening special injury
to a private plaintiff and the plaintiff was able to win an injunction
against the nuisance, the same remedy that protected the plaintiff
against private harm also benefited the public as a whole. As a
conceptual matter, however, this benefit to the public was
"incidental[)"; the private plaintiff was not thought of as representing
the public, but rather as protecting his own private interest.61 As the
U.S. Supreme Court put it in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co. , when a public nuisance was causing a special and
irreparable injury to a particular individual, it was redressable as "a
private nuisance to the injured party."62
In the Wheeling Bridge case, the plaintiff was the state of
Pennsylvania, which complained that a bridge erected by the
defendant in Virginia was obstructing the public right of navigation on
the Ohio River. The Court permitted Pennsylvania to seek an
injunction against this public nuisance, but not because the state was a
proper plaintiff to bring suit on behalf of the people of the United
States. The only reason that the state could proceed was that it was
suffering "special damage" to its own property.63 As the Court had
emphasized in an earlier opinion upholding the dismissal of a suit for
want of proper parties, a private plaintiff seeking to enjoin a public

for a public nusance" unless he "suffers some extraordinary damage, beyond the rest of the
king's subjects").
60. See, e.g., Hughes v. Heiser, 1 Binn. 463 (Pa. 1808); see also O.B. Farrelly & Co. v.
City of Cincinnati, 2 Disney 516, 522-37 (Super. Ct. Cincinnati 1859) (reviewing innumerable
decisions on this question).
61. Sparhawk v. Union Passenger R. Co., 54 Pa. 401, 421-22 (1867).
62. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 564 (1852); see also id. at 566 ("[A] public nuisance is also a
private nuisance, where a special and an irremediable mischief is done to an individual.").
The Court's rhetoric sometimes departed from this conceptualization. See, e.g. , Miss. & Mo.
R.R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 492 (1863) (asserting that when a private plaintiff
files a bill in equity to enjoin a public nuisance, he "sues rather as a public prosecutor than
on his own account"); cf id. (acknowledging that the plaintiff "seeks redress of a continuing
trespass and wrong against himself," but adding that he "acts in behalf of all others, who are
or may be injured"). Still, the conceptualization of the plaintiff as a private actor continued
to drive the Court's doctrine. See id. ("[U]nless he shows that he has sustained, and is still
sustaining, individual damage, he cannot be heard.").
63. See Wheeling Bridge, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 626 (emphasizing, in the Court's decree,
that the defendant's bridge was causing "special damage" to Pennsylvania's proprietary
interests); see also id. at 561 ("[Pennsylvania] asks from the court a protection of its
property, on the same ground and to the same extent as a corporation or individual may ask
it."). The state had invested millions of dollars in building canals and railroads linking inland
cities in Pennsylvania to cities on the Ohio River, and the defendant's bridge allegedly was
frustrating the purpose of these extraordinary investments. In addition, the defendant's
obstruction of navigation on the river allegedly was causing Pennsylvania to lose toll revenue
on its canals.

Michigan Law Review

704

[Vol. 102:689

nuisance "cannot maintain a stand in a court of equity[] unless he
avers and proves some special injury."64
The same ideas applied as a matter of general jurisprudence in the
states as well. Writing in 1899, William Hale summed up a century of
case law as follows:
The interest which an individual has in common with all other citizens or
members of the state or municipality is insufficient to authorize him to
maintain an action founded upon a public wrong affecting the people at
large in the same manner. A party cannot vindicate the rights of others
by process in his own name, nor employ civil process to punish wrongs to
the public.65

3.

Issue-Specific Standing

Critics of the modern Supreme Court often suggest that earlier
generations had no concept of standing apart from the traditional
forms of action.66 But even when the plaintiff's allegations fit into one
of the established writs and therefore enabled him to bring a case to
court, separate doctrines operated at an issue-specific level to keep
private parties from litigating certain matters of public right. These
doctrines may have been more susceptible to legislative change than
doctrines affecting whether there was a "Case" in the first place. Still,
these issue-specific rules reflected the strength of the general principle
against private enforcement of public rights: even in the context of
otherwise justiciable controversies between two private parties,
litigants often could not claim the extracompensatory benefits of a
duty owed to the public.

64. Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 99 (1838)
(affirming the circuit court's decree dismissing a bill that failed to allege special damage).
Professor Winter describes the requirement of special damage in both Alexandria Canal Co.
and Wheeling Bridge as "an artifact of the historic jurisdictional fight between law and
equity." See Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1420, 1421 n.269. Exactly what he means
by this phrase is unclear, but one should not infer that the requirement of private injury was
a special rule of equity. To the contrary, this requirement had long been enforced at law, and
courts of equity quite naturally incorporated it when they began permitting some private
people to seek injunctions against public nuisances. See Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) at 98. Throughout the nineteenth century, it was "well established" that no person
could maintain a public·nuisance action in a court of law "unless he sustains a special
damage therefrom, different from that sustained by the rest of the public." WOOD, supra
note 50, at 655; see also id. at 835 (noting that no one could seek an injunction against a
public nuisance "unless he could maintain an action in a court of law").

65. William B. Hale, Parties to Actions, in 15 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PLEADING AND
PRACTICE 456, 472-73 (William M. McKinney ed., Long Island, NY, Edward Thompson Co.
1899) (footnotes omitted}; see also id. at 473 (noting that "where a public wrong results in
special and peculiar damage to an individual, differing in kind and not merely in degree from
that suffered by the public at large, he may maintain an action individually to protect his
interests").
66.

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

February 2004]

Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?

705

For example, courts used standing doctrines (and, in particular, the
restriction on private invocations of public rights) to limit the impact
of rules restricting the capacity of aliens to own land. At common law,
when lands were sold or devised to an alien, "the king [was] thereupon
entitled to them" and could launch proceedings to seize them; people
who did not owe allegiance to the king could not "acquire a
permanent property in lands," lest the nation become "subject to
foreign influence."67 Although the United States sometimes entered
into treaties waiving this principle with respect to the citizens of
particular countries,68 and although individual states eventually
adopted statutes deviating from the principle more generally,69 there
was a time when many states adhered to the common law rule.
Even in those states, however, private litigants generally could not
assert the public's right to the land; the public (as represented by
public officers) was in charge of when and whether to initiate the
necessary "inquest of office" to seize the property. Thus, when a
plaintiff sued someone for trespassing upon land in the plaintiff's
possession, the defendant could not escape liability by proving that the
plaintiff was an alien.70 Similarly, in ejectment and other controversies
between rival land claimants, the party with the otherwise inferior
claim could not prevail on the ground that his opponent was an alien
or had an alien in the chain of title.71 As the U.S. Supreme Court
67. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *371-72.
68. See, e.g. , Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., art. 1 1 , 8 Stat. 12,
18, interpreted in Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 270-71 , 275 (1817); see
also Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-G.B., art. 9, 8 Stat.
1 16, 122 (waiving the disabilities of alienage with respect to lands that were in British hands
at the time of the treaty).
69. See generally Polly J. Price, Alien Land Restrictions in the A merican Common Law:
Exploring the Relative A utonomy Paradigm, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 152 (1999) (discussing
common law rules and statutory deviations from them).
70. See, e.g. , Barges v. Hogg, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 485, 485 (Super. Ct. 1 797) (conceding
that an alien's purchase of property "will be for the benefit of the public whenever the State
thinks proper to exert its right by causing an office to be found," but observing that "no
individual can . . . violate the possession of the alien purchaser" before then, and sustaining
an alien's trespass action on the ground that her possession "is lawful as to all persons but
the State").
71. See, e.g., M'Creery's Lessee v. Allender, 4 H. & McH. 409, 412 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1799);
Sheaffe v. O'Neil, 1 Mass. 256, 257-58 (1804); Jackson v. Lunn, 3 Johns. Cas. 109, 1 12-13
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802) (Radcliff, J.). But see Barges, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at 485 (dictum) ("An
alien cannot maintain ejectment or any action for the recovery of a freehold."), disavowed in
Rouche v. Williamson, 25 N.C. 141, 146-49 (1842).
The statement in the text requires one qualification. If the alien claimed to have
acquired his title not by purchase, grant, or devise, but simply by operation of law, then his
alienage was relevant and would defeat his claim. See, e.g. , Paul v. Ward, 15 N.C. 247, 248
(1833) (observing that "the law will not cast an estate on [an alien]"). For instance, when a
landowner died intestate with an alien heir, the law of inheritance skipped the alien and
passed the estate to "those persons who would take it, if the alien were not in being." Id. If
the alien nonetheless tried to take possession of the land, the true heir could prevail in an
ejectment action by pointing out that title to the land had vested in him because his
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uniformly held in such situations, "[n]o one has any right to complain
in a collateral proceeding, if the sovereign does not enforce his
prerogative. "72
Courts commonly applied the same rules to corporations that
violated state laws against land ownership. Pennsylvania law, for
instance, provided that if a corporation purchased land in the state
without the legislature's authorization, the land would be forfeited to
the state.73 Both the Pennsylvania and the U.S. Supreme Courts
analogized corporations that violated this rule to aliens who took
property by purchase or devise: the corporations held a defeasible
estate to the land, which could be divested only "by due course of law,
instituted by the commonwealth alone."74 Similarly, it was widely held
that when a state chartered a corporation but did not give it the power
to own land, "a conveyance to [the corporation] is not void, but only
voidable, and the sovereign alone can object."75
Cognate problems arose under congressional legislation
authorizing national banks but prohibiting them from owning real
property except in certain circumstances. Debtors seeking to avoid
foreclosure repeatedly invoked the banks' disability on land
ownership. Just as repeatedly, however, the Supreme Court responded
adversary was an alien. In this situation, the true heir was enforcing private rights that had
already vested in him.
72. Osterman v. B aldwin, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 1 16, 121-22 (1867); see also Cross v. De
Valle, 68 U.S. ( 1 Wall.) 5, 13 (1864) ("That an alien may take by deed or devise, and hold
against any one but the sovereign until office found, is a familiar principle of law, which it
requires no citation of authorities to establish."); Governeur's Heirs v. Robertson, 24 U.S.
(11 Wheat.) 332, 351-58 (1826) (holding that when a state had granted land to an alien and
later had purported to grant part of the same land to someone else, the initial grant to the
alien was not "void," but rather gave the alien a defeasible estate that could be divested only
through appropriate proceedings initiated by the state); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 1 U.S. ( 7 Cranch) 603, 619-22 (1813) (holding that at common law, when a citizen's
will devised land to an alien, the alien took the land "for the benefit of the state" but
enjoyed title unless and until the state validly conducted a formal inquest of office).
73. See, e.g. , Act of Apr. 6, 1833, 1832-33 Pa. Laws 167, 168 (reciting that "no
corporation . . . can . . . purchase lands within this state . . . without incurring the forfeiture of
said lands to this commonwealth, unless said purchase be sanctioned and authorized by an
act of the legislature thereof").
74. Runyan v. Lessee of Coster, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 122, 131 ( 1840) (holding that private
defendants could not assert the corporation's disability in an ejectment action brought
against them by the corporation's lessees); see also Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 Serg. & Rawle 313,
322 (Pa. 1821) (analogizing the corporation to an alien and observing that while English
cases left this point in doubt, "we have the highest authority in our own country for saying,
that until some Act done by the Commonwealth . . . to vest the estate in itself, it remains in
the alien").
75. Nat'! Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S. 621, 628 ( 1879 ) (citing cases); cf Murphy v.
Farmers' Bank, 20 Pa. 415, 418-20 (1853) (holding that even when a corporation had abused
the privileges conferred upon it by the state and its charter was subject to forfeiture, the
corporation's usurpations of its franchise were "public wrongs and not private injuries," and
so no one "except the Attorney-General[) or other officer of the Commonwealth" could
seek a writ of quo warranto from the state's supreme court to dissolve the corporation).
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that the disability was a duty owed to the government and not to
private parties.76 Courts had the same reaction in disputes about
federal land grants; when junior claimants sought to raise technical
defects with the procedures that the Land Office had used to grant
title to the otherwise senior claimant, courts sometimes told them that
any complaints belonged solely to the government.77
Rules of this sort, which put the power to enforce forfeitures in
public hands, both preserved the legitimate exercise of public
authority by public officials and limited the vulnerability of the aliens
or corporations to self-interested enforcers. When private parties
sought to avoid mortgages on the ground that national banks could
not hold real estate, the Court noted that the proper public authorities
could use the sanction of dissolution to punish wanton violations of
corporate charters, and " [a] private person cannot, directly or
indirectly, usurp this function of the government."78 Similarly, the
Court praised the rules that kept private adventurers from
complaining about aliens in someone else's chain of title as a means of
"protect[ing] the individual from arbitrary aggression."79
4.

Is Mandamus a Counterexample?

Steven Winter does not deny that most private litigation in the
early Republic fits what he calls "the private rights model of
adjudication,"80 under which private litigants generally cannot initiate
suits to vindicate public rights. He concedes that the common law
forms of action are consistent with that model,81 and he acknowledges
that "the common law forms of action dominated the legal process and
jurisprudential thought of the time."82 He insists, however, that the
76. See, e.g. , Swope v. Leffingwell, 105 U.S. 3 (1881) (affirming a state court's dismissal
of a bill to enjoin the sale of real estate); Matthews, 98 U.S. at 629 (reversing a state court's
injunction against a sale); see also Reynolds v. Crawfordsville First Nat'! Bank, 112 U.S. 405
(1884) (holding that the bank was not forbidden by charter from holding property in this
case, and also noting the general principle that where a corporation is incompetent by
charter to take real estate, a conveyance to it is not void, but voidable, and only by the
sovereign).
77. See, e.g., Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 647 (1882) ("It does not lie in the
mouth of a stranger to the title to complain of the act of the government with respect to it. If
the government is dissatisfied, it can, on its own account, authorize proceedings to vacate the
patent or limit its operation.").
78. Matthews, 98 U.S. at 629.
79. Governeur's Heirs, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) at 356.
80. See Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1377 & n.29 (crediting this phrase to
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1365-68 (1973)).
81. See id. at 1396 (referring to "the private rights model of the seven common law
forms of action").
82. Id.
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private-rights model does not exhaust early practice. As evidence of
the parallel existence of "non-individualistic, group models of
adjudication," he points to actions seeking writs of mandamus against
defendants accused of breaching public duties.83 Joined by Professor
Sunstein, he suggests that courts of the early Republic routinely
permitted private citizens "who had no personal interest or injury-in
fact" to initiate and conduct mandamus actions on behalf of the public
at large.84
Professor Winter concedes that mandamus practice was
"underdeveloped" in the federal courts;85 that is, early federal courts
did not actually entertain mandamus actions initiated by private
relators who lacked private injury. On the strength of English history
and practice in the state courts, however, he suggests that federal
courts would have entertained such actions if not for technical
problems unrelated to standing.86
English practice with respect to mandamus is disputed. Professor
Jaffe reports that King's Bench used mandamus and other prerogative
writs "primarily to control authorities below the level of the central
government," such as local governments and other corporate bodies
that derived their powers "from statute, decree, or charter."87 While
Professor Jaffe presents cases strongly suggesting that private
individuals sometimes sought mandamus against these entities without
showing any special personal interest,88 Bradley Clanton maintains
that the evidence does not support this conclusion.89 In any event,
mandamus actions against "local and discrete authorities,"90 brought
by residents of the locality in question, do not present the purest
possible case of public-rights litigation; members of a municipal

83. Id. at 1391. Professor Winter also points to statutory qui tam actions, which we
discuss in Part III.

84. See id. at 1377, 1402-03; see also Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public
Law, supra note 5, at 1434 n.9 (suggesting that mandamus practice, "especially at the origin
of the republic," was inconsistent with "modern notions of injury in fact").
85. Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1405.
86. Id.
87. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review, supra note 7, at 1269-70.
88. See id. at 1270 (noting that "[t]he reported cases were almost uniformly ones in
which mandamus served the plaintiff as a 'remedy,' " but asserting that "the lists of cases in
the digests strongly suggest the possibility that the plaintiff in some of them was without a
personal interest" (footnote omitted)).
89. See Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs: The Original
Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001, 1043-47 (1997) (acknowledging unclarity in the
case reports about the nature of some parties' interests, but finding evidence in other legal
writings that "mandamus was not available to 'disinterested strangers' ").
90. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review, supra note 7, at 1270.
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corporation have interests in the corporation's conduct that are not
shared by members of the public at large.91
To the extent that English practice does support Professor
Winter's "public rights model," however, American departures from
that practice are all the more striking. Writing in 1834, Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts identified the "general rule" as
" [u]ndoubtedly" being the following:
[A] private individual can apply for a writ of mandamus only in a case

where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some
particular right to be pursued or protected by the aid of this process,
independent of that which he holds in common with the public at large;

and it is for the public officers exclusively to apply, where public rights

are to be subserved.92

If the modem critics of standing doctrine are correct about English
practice, then American courts that required private relators to allege
some special private interest were not simply applying the settled
common law forms.
It is true that some state c::ourts did not follow Shaw's dictum; while
they agreed that individuals had no litigable interest of their own in
"wrongs against the public,"93 they understood the law in their states
to authorize individual citizens to seek mandamus on the public's
behalf. In 1837, New York's Supreme Court of Judicature held that
any citizen could initiate a mandamus action in the public's name
against local governmental officers who allegedly were breaching
duties owed to the public,94 and the state's court of last resort
eventually approved this practice.95 By the Civil War, at least three

91. Cf Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1923) (discussing "the peculiar
relation of the [municipal] taxpayer to the corporation," which resembles in some ways the
relation "between stockholder and private corporation," and observing that "the relation of
a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is very different").
92 In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 105 (1834). But see Winter, The Metaphor,
supra note 4, at 1404 n.167 (asserting that Shaw was wrong to call this proposition the
"general rule," but citing no contrary American cases decided before 1837).
93. Doolittle v. Bd. of Supervisors, 18 N.Y. 155, 159 (1858).
94. See People ex rel. Case v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 65-67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); see also
People ex rel. Fuller v. Bd. of Supervisors, 18 How. Pr. 461, 463 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860)
(following Collins); People ex rel. Blacksmith v. Tracy, 1 How. Pr. 186, 189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1845) (citing Collins approvingly in dictum).
95. See People ex rel. Stephens v. Halsey, 37 N.Y. 344, 347 (1867). Even in New York,
mandamus was a limited exception to the general rule giving only public officers authority to
litigate on behalf of the public. See Doolittle, 18 N.Y. at 158-59 (rejecting a suit for injunctive
relief where "no injury peculiar to [the plaintiffs] is threatened," and adding that "[t]he
general rule certainly is that for wrongs against the public, . . . the remedy, whether civil or
criminal, is by a prosecution instituted by the state in its political character, or by some
officer authorized by law to act in its behalf"); see also id. at 163 ("No private person
or number of persons can assume to be the champions of the community, and in its be
half challenge the public officers to meet them in the courts of justice to defend their offi
cial acts.").
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other states had followed suit,96 although an equal number of states
had explicitly rejected the New York practice.97
Professors Winter98 and Sunstein99 emphasize the 1875 case of
Union Pacific Railroad v. Hall, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
indicated that "a decided preponderance of American authority"
supported a limited version of the New York rule.100 Although the
state decisions had in fact been evenly divided, this statement led
some more states toward the New York camp.101 But whatever the
practice in state systems, federal courts had never before indicated that
private relators could seek mandamus on behalf of the American
public without regard to their own private injury. 102 Indeed, even Hall
was not understood to establish such a rule. In Hall itself, the Court
held that the private parties seeking mandamus had suffered special
injury of the sort required in public-nuisance cases,103 and subsequent
courts did not understand Hall to authorize "citizen suits" seeking
mandamus on the public's behalf against errant governmental
officials.104

96. See County Comm'rs v. People ex rel. Metz, 11 Ill. 202, 208 (1849) (citing and
following Collins); Hamilton v. State ex rel. Bates, 3 Ind. 452, 458 (1852) (same); State ex rel.
Rice v. County Judge, 7 Iowa (7 Clarke) 186, 202 (1858) (same).
97. See Sanger v. County Cornm'rs, 25 Me. 291, 296 (1845); People ex rel. Russell v.
Inspectors of the State Prison, 4 Mich. 187, 188-89 (1856); Heffner v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Kline, 28 Pa. 108, 112 (1857); see also People ex rel. Drake v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 4
Mich. 98, 101-03 (1856) (declining to issue mandamus at the behest of a relator "who is only
interested in common with all other citizens of the state in the subject matter of complaint,"
though reserving the possibility of exceptions "if the attorney-general or prosecuting
attorney . . . were absent, or refused to act without good cause"); cf Halsey, 37 N.Y. at 347
(acknowledging that the New York rule adopted in Collins "differ[s] from that which
prevails in many of the other States").
98. See Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1404.
99. See Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 174.
100. 91 U.S. 343, 355 (1875) ("There is, we think, a decided preponderance of American
authority in favor of the doctrine, that private persons may move for a mandamus to enforce
a public duty, not due to the government as such, without the intervention of the
government law-officer.").
101. Compare, e.g. , Pearsons v. Ranlett, 110 Mass. 1 18, 126 (1872) ("Undoubtedly, when
a private citizen applies for a writ of mandamus, he must show that he has some special
interest in the subject matter different from the interest which every other citizen has."),
with Attorney General v. City of Boston, 123 Mass. 460, 479 (1877) (echoing Hall).
102. Cf Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause ofAction, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777,
818 (2004) ("(T]hat individuals who had suffered no particularized injury had causes of
action in limited instances in English and state courts does not prove that the American
constitutional structure contemplated the same practice in federal courts.").
103. See Hall, 91 U.S. at 355.
104. See, e.g. , United States ex rel. Alsop Process Co. v. Wilson, 33 App. D.C. 472, 479
(1909). That court wrote:

In all the cases relied upon by relator [including Hall], mandamus was granted to secure
to the relators rights which they were entitled personally to enjoy. Measured by this
test, it is apparent that the relator has no such interest in the subject-matter of this

February 2004]

Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?

711

To explain why federal courts had never had occasion to embrace
the New York rule more vigorously, Professor Winter points to limits
on their subject-matter j urisdiction.105 As a matter of constitutional
interpretation, Marbury v. Madison106 held that Congress could not
give the U.S. Supreme Court original jurisdiction to entertain suits
seeking mandamus against nonjudicial officers; as a matter of
statutory interpretation, M'Intire v. Wood107 held that most lower
federal courts also lacked this jurisdiction. As Professor Winter
concedes, however, the federal circuit court for the District of
Columbia did have jurisdiction over requests for mandamus against
executive officers, and the Supreme Court could review its decisions

controversy as to entitle it to the writ. . . . It is a mere volunteer in this proceeding, and,
as such, is without standing.
Id.; see also United States ex rel. Am. Silver Producers' Ass'n v. Mellon, 32 F.2d 415, 418
(D.C. 1929) (holding that the relator must show "that he will sustain a personal injury by the
threatened violation").
105. See Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1405. In a separate argument, Professor
Winter also points to Hayburn 's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), in which an evenly divided
Court refused to let Attorney General Edmund Randolph seek a writ of mandamus
requiring a lower federal court to entertain William Hayburn's petition for disability
benefits. See Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1400 ("The Court's deadlock on this
issue eliminated the availability of the English relator action: The relator could hardly
invoke the 'standing' of the attorney general if the attorney general had none."). The Court
in Hayburn's Case may not actually have reached the issue of standing. See Maeva Marcus &
Robert Teir, Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 527
(inferring from Justice Iredell's notes that the issue that divided the Court instead concerned
the Attorney General's ability to act independently of the President) . But if Professor
Winter is correct, then this aspect of Hayburn's Case rests on the public/private distinction: it
suggests that a public officer was not the proper party to pursue Hayburn's private
entitlement in court.
After the Court refused the motion that Attorney General Randolph filed as a
representative of the government, Randolph returned to the Court as the lawyer for
Hayburn, and he filed a new motion in that capacity. 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 38 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1998)
[hereinafter DHSC]. Professor Winter argues that the Court's willingness to entertain the
new motion cuts against modern standing doctrine. See Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4,
at 1401 ("The Hayburn Court accepted Randolph's invocation of a representational model,
premised on a part-whole structure, that did not require allegation of specific, personal
injury: Randolph, a representative of the whole, was allowed to proceed with the mandamus
petition on behalf of Hayburn, a part."). This argument, however, rests on the mistaken
premise that the Attorney General was still proceeding as a lawyer for the government, and
that the government was being allowed to "rais[e] the rights of third parties." Id. In fact,
Randolph was not appearing in his official capacity but rather as private counsel for
Hayburn. See Hayburn 's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409 (noting that after the rejection of his
original motion, the Attorney General appeared "at the instance, and on behalf of Hayburn,
a party interested"); see also FEDERAL GAZETTE, Aug. 15, 1792, reprinted in 6 DHSC,
supra, at 68, 68 (noting that after the Court divided on his motion ex officio, Randolph "then
appeared as counsel for the invalids"). In those days, it was not unheard of for the Attorney
General to represent private clients; Randolph did the same thing in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 131 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994).
106. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
107. 1 1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813).
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on appeal.108 In exercising that jurisdiction, neither of these courts
suggested that private individuals suffering no special private injury
could seek mandamus to vindicate public rights. To the contrary, the
Supreme Court spoke of the circuit court's mandamus jurisdiction as a
means to enforce "private rights,"109 and opinions from Marbury on
highlighted the need for private relators to allege private injuryY0
* * * * *

The above discussion suggests that standing issues were alive and
well in arguments about whether private parties could vindicate public
rights, and cannot be explained entirely by reference to common law
requirements for causes of action. To be sure, in public-nuisance cases,
the Court was following English rules in requiring a private injury. But
accor<ling to the standing critics' own history, American courts that
required private injury in mandamus cases were not constrained by
the established forms. The common law forms also did not compel
Americans to reject private prosecution. Both of these areas reflect
the influence of the more general notion that public officers pursue
public rights and private parties pursue private rights. Even when a
private plaintiff had stated a proper claim for relief, moreover, the
American courts used issue-specific standing rules to prevent parties
from usurping the power of government. Central concerns were that
the control of public rights should remain in the hands of public
officials and that individuals should be free from arbitrary
enforcement at the hands of private actors.
II. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF STANDING
Critics of the Supreme Court's approach to standing may respond
that even if "citizen suits" were not familiar features of the common
law, the federal courts still did not see standing as a constitutional
issue. According to Steven Winter,
a painstaking search of the historical material demonstrates that - for
the first

150

years of the Republic - the Framers, the first Congresses,

and the Court were oblivious to the modern conception either that

108. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 615-22 (1838).
109. See, e.g. , id. at 619 (basing its interpretation of the circuit court's mandamus
jurisdiction in part on the principle "that in every well organized government the judicial
power should be coextensive with the legislative, so far at least as private rights are to be
enforced by judicial proceedings"); cf Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 97
(1860) (noting that mandamus "is not now regarded as a prerogative writ," but rather "in
modern practice is nothing more than an action at law between the parties"); Kendall v.
Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87, 100 (1845) (similar).
110. See infra Part II.A.
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controversies" or that it is a prerequisite for seeking governmental
compliance with the law. 1 1 1

Cass Sunstein similarly suggests that the Supreme Court did not start
discussing standing in constitutional terms until the 1940s.112
Contrary to the critics' claims, however, the Supreme Court did see
some standing issues as constitutional, expressing particular concerns
about unwarranted judicial interference with the federal and state
political branches. While the nineteenth-century Court did not always
make the constitutional nature of its concerns as clear as the
twentieth-century Court has, the more recent decisions are continuous
with historical tradition.
A.

Mandamus Continued

Mandamus actions, though hailed by the Supreme Court's modem
critics as evidence against the Court's position, actually suggest the
constitutional dimensions of requiring private injury for actions
against governmental officials. From Marbury on, the Supreme Court
not only focused on private rights in mandamus proceedings against
executive officers, but also portrayed that focus as an important aspect
of the federal government's separation of powers. The Court
disclaimed any pretensions "to intermeddle with the prerogatives of
the executive" or "to enquire how the executive, or executive officers,
perform duties in which they have a discretion"; instead, " [t]he
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals."113 But when an executive officer was illegally refusing to
perform a ministerial duty, and when "an individual sustains an
injury" by virtue of this refusal, the "injured individual" could
appropriately seek mandamus from a court with j urisdiction.114 The
Court continued to articulate the twin requirements of a ministerial
duty and an individual injury throughout the century.115
1 1 1 . Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1374.
1 12. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 169, 177; see also supra
note 9.
113. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170.
114. See id. at 170-71; see also Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 509 (1840)
(argument of counsel) (emphasizing Marbury's distinction between ministerial acts
"affecting individual or private rights" and "those of a public or political character").
115. See, e.g. , M'lntire, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 506 ("Had the 1 1th section of the judiciary
act covered the whole ground of the constitution, there would be much reason for exercising
this power [to issue the writ of mandamus] in many cases wherein some ministerial act is
necessary to the completion of an individual right arising under laws of the United
States . . . . "); Kendall v. United States ex rel Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 616-17 (1838)
(echoing this language from M'lntire and holding mandamus appropriate because "the case
now before the Court, is precisely one of that description"); see also Bd. of Liquidation v.
McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1875) ("[W]hen a plain official duty, requiring no exercise of
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Evidence from the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction

Matters brought to the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction
elicited some of the Court's clearest statements of the requirement of
a private right to contest governmental action. Article III allowed the
Court to exercise original jurisdiction over various "Controversies" to
which states were parties, including those in which a state was
proceeding against a citizen of another state.116 One might wonder why
suits brought by states would shed any light on the requirements for
private litigation. But the nineteenth-century Court did not view its
original jurisdiction as an appropriate place for states to prosecute the
run of public rights; a state that wanted to launch a criminal
prosecution or an enforcement action seeking fines or penalties had to
start off in its own courts.117 States were allowed to use the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction primarily to pursue claims for property,
breach of contract, or the like - civil claims of the same sort that an
ordinary private litigant might assert. As a result, the Court's view
about the kinds of interests that states could pursue in its original
jurisdiction reflected prevailing sentiments about the kinds of claims
that private litigants could pursue in lower federal courts.
As Henry Paul Monaghan has noted, the Supreme Court's
comments on this point reflected its understanding that private
plaintiffs had to assert "concrete 'private rights. ' "1 1 8 What is more, the
Court associated this requirement with the Constitution.
After the Civil War, for instance, the State of Georgia sought to
challenge the constitutionality of federal statutes establishing military
government in the South, and it asked the Supreme Court to enjoin
the execution of those statutes. But in Georgia v. Stanton,119 the Court
held that the state's dispute with federal executive officers had not
taken the form of "a case . . . appropriate for the exercise of judicial

discretion, is to be performed, and performance is refused, any person who will sustain
personal injury by such refusal may have a mandamus to compel its performance").
1 16. U.S. CONST. art. Ill,§ 2.
117. See, e.g. , Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 300 (1888) (refusing to take
jurisdiction even over a suit to enforce a judgment that a state had won in a separate penal
action brought in state court), overruled in part by Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.,
296 U.S. 268 (1935); see also Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Gwin v. Breedlove,
43 U.S. 29, 37 (1844). See generally Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing,
81 VA. L. REV. 387, 422-31 (1995).
118. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE
L.J. 1363, 1367 (1973). Professor Monaghan goes on to condemn the Court's approach to the
state-as-party cases, calling it "wholly unsatisfactory." Id. at 1368. The specific complaint
that prompts this comment, however, is not so much that the Court required private litigants
to show private injury, but rather that the Court treated states like ordinary private litigants.
See id.
1 19. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
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power."120 The reason was simple: "No case of private rights or private
property infringed, or in danger of actual or threatened infringement,
is presented by the bill . . . . "121 To be sure, Georgia did have some sort
of interests at stake; it was seeking protection for "the rights of
sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate
existence as a State, with all its constitutional powers and
privileges."122 But these "merely political rights" were not interests of
the sort that could support litigation. To present the court with a
justiciable controversy, "the rights in danger . . . must be rights of
persons or property. "123
Stanton was no innovation; it relied heavily upon Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia,124 in which the Marshall Court had refused to entertain the
tribe's suit for an injunction to repel Georgia's legislative and military
encroachments upon Cherokee land and governance. Although
resting his decision upon the fact that the Cherokee Nation was not a
"foreign state[]" within the meaning of the Original Jurisdiction
Clause, Chief Justice Marshall strongly suggested that at least some of
the interests asserted by the tribe were not "the proper subject for
judicial inquiry and decision."125 In a concurrence, Justice Johnson
declared the Cherokees' entire bill "unfit for the cognizance of a
judicial tribunal," because the interests at stake did not present "a case
of meum and tuum in the judicial . . . sense."126
Even Justice Thompson, who dissented, agreed that " [t]his court
can grant relief so far only as the rights of person or property are
drawn in question, and have been infringed";127 he simply believed that
the Cherokee Nation had stated a justiciable claim about the
deprivation of certain specific property interests (such as the tribe's
right to the possession and use of some mines), and that the Court was
therefore wrong to throw out the entire bill. In language that the
Stanton Court would quote with approval, he conceded the limits on
the kinds of rights that litigants could seek to protect in federal court,
and he linked those limits to the constitutional separation of powers:
·

120. Id. at 76.
121. Id. at 77.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 76.
124. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
125. Id. at 20 ("On several of the matters alleged in the bill, for example on the laws
making it criminal to exercise the usual powers of self government in their own country by
the Cherokee nation, this court cannot interpose; at least in the form in which those matters
are presented.").
126. Id. at 28-29 (Johnson, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 51 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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I certainly . . . do not claim, as belonging to the j udiciary, the exercise of
political power. That belongs to another branch of government. The

protection and enforcement of many rights, secured by treaties, most
certainly do not belong to the judiciary. It is only where the rights of
persons or property are involved, and when such rights can be presented
under some j udicial form of proceedings, that courts of j ustice can

interpose relief.128

Although various Justices in both Stanton and Cherokee Nation
adverted to the line between judicial and political power, their
opinions cannot be written off as manifestations of the political
question doctrine rather than the constitutional dimensions of
standing.129 The problem the Justices were discussing was not that the
legal issues raised by the plaintiffs were nonjusticiable, but simply that
the plaintiffs were not proper parties to litigate those issues because
they did not have the right sort of interests at stake. 13° The Court stood
ready to decide the legality of Georgia's Cherokee statutes and
Congress's Reconstruction statutes when proper parties presented
themselves in appeals from criminal prosecutions 1 3 1 and habeas
cases. 1 32 But private litigation could not proceed when "rights of
persons or property" were not at stake. The Court reiterated this
principle throughout the nineteenth century.133
C.

Private Rights ofAnother: State- and Private-Party Cases

The nineteenth-century Supreme Court's tendency to hold states
that invoked its original jurisdiction to the same standing requirements
as private parties had a corollary: injuries to another private party did
128. Id. at 75 (Thompson, J., dissenting); see also Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 75
(quoting this passage and others to the same effect).
129. Cf Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1437 (arguing that in Stanton, "the
Court did not apply the private rights model as an alternative to the intermediate public
rights model, but rather as an alternative to viewing certain matters as nonjusticiable
'political questions' ").
130. See, e.g. , DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT, 17891888: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 303-04 (1985) (concluding that "the trouble [in Stanton]
was . . . not with the issue but with the party").
131. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
132. See Ex parte Mccardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866).
133. See, e.g. , California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893) ("The
duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons or
of property, which are actually controverted in the particular case before it."); Marye v.
Parsons, 114 U.S. 325, 330 (1885) ("[N]o court sits to determine questions of law in thesi.
There must be a litigation upon actual transactions between real parties, growing out of a
controversy affecting legal or equitable rights as to person or property."); see also, e.g., 7 Op.
Att'y Gen. 229, 237 (1855) ("We provide courts of justice . . . in order that parties may have
lawful means to collect debts, recover damages for private injury, and otherwise obtain
adjudication of their private rights of person or property . . . . ").
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not ordinarily suffice to give states standing. In particular, states
generally could not bring cases to vindicate the private rights of their
citizens.134 Because a state that tried to do so could not point to any
litigable interest of its own, the Court did not view it as a proper party
to a genuine case or controversy, even if state law purported to let the
state bring suit. Thus, when New York and New Hampshire passed
legislation purporting to let those states sue Louisiana on behalf of
individual citizens to whom Louisiana owed money, the Court
rebuffed the suits; in the Court's view, "one State cannot create a
controversy with another State, within the meaning of that term as
used in the judicial clauses of the Constitution, by assuming the
prosecution of debts owing by the other State to its citizens. "135 By
contrast, when the individual creditors had genuinely assigned their
bonds to a state, so that the right to collect upon the bonds was truly
the property of the state itself, the state could properly invoke the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction.136
This sort of analysis was not confined to the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction. In exercising its appellate jurisdiction over suits
brought in lower federal courts by individual plaintiffs, the Court also
treated averments of private injury as a prerequisite for private
litigation. In Williams v. Hagood, 137 for instance, an individual plaintiff
sought to challenge the constitutionality of two South Carolina laws
that allegedly impaired the obligation of contracts into which the state
had entered. Although the federal courts could certainly have
considered the constitutionality of those laws "if the complainant had
placed himself in a position to invoke our judgment," the Supreme
Court held that he had failed to do so: "His bill does not aver that he
has been injured, or will be injured, by this legislation . . . . "138 In the
absence of such an averment, "(t]he question presented to the court
is . . . merely an abstract one; such a one as no court can be called
upon to decide . . . . "139
134. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 288 (5th ed. 2003) (noting the rule that "a state, when
it is merely sponsoring the claims of a small number of individual citizens, has no standing to
sue either another state or a private party"); see also id. at 289 (noting that the Court was at
first equally "unreceptive" to state attempts to sue as parens patriae). In the twentieth
century, the Court moved away from the notion that, for standing purposes, states invoking
its original jurisdiction should be treated like private parties invoking the jurisdiction of a
lower federal court. See id. at 289-92 (discussing the extent to which states can now launch
parens patriae litigation in the Supreme Court to protect "quasi-sovereign interests - i.e.,
public or governmental interests that concern the state as a whole").
135. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883).
136. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 ( 1904).
137. 98 U.S. 72 (1878).
138. Id. at 74.
139. Id. at 75 (agreeing with the lower federal court's decision to dismiss the bill); cf
Marye v. Parsons, 1 14 U.S. 325, 330 (1884) (disallowing a suit to enjoin state officers from
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The twentieth-century Court's decisions in Massachusetts v. Mellon
and Frothingham v. Mellon140 - sometimes portrayed as ushering in a
radical break with the past141 - are continuous with these older cases.
In concluding that neither Massachusetts nor an individual federal
taxpayer had standing to challenge a federal spending program that
allegedly exceeded Congress's enumerated powers and thereby
invaded the sovereign authority of the states, the Court explicitly
invoked the justiciability language of both Stanton and Cherokee
Nation.142 Like Georgia's challenge to military Reconstruction,
Massachusetts's challenge to the federal statute implicated " [n]o rights
of the State falling within the scope of the judicial power" and hence
fell outside of the federal courts' jurisdiction.143 The individual
taxpayer's claim was no better; the only additional feature it presented
was a suggestion that the program would increase the burden of
federal taxes, and a private plaintiff's assertion "that [s]he suffers in
some indefinite way in common with people generally" did not give
her the basis for "a judicial controversy" in her own right.144
Ill.

LEGISLATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING

The opinions discussed above suggest that, contrary to modern
critics' claims, the nineteenth-century Supreme Court did see standing
as a constitutional concern. But even if the critics were to
acknowledge this point, they might nevertheless argue that the
constitutional issues would have vanished if only legislation had given
the would-be plaintiffs a statutory right to sue. Everyone agrees, after
all, that Congress has considerable leeway in recognizing legal

refusing to accept bond coupons for taxes, and explaining that because the plaintiff was not a
taxpayer, the litigation was not presented in a posture that was "judicially determinable"); In
re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 496 (1887) (using similar reasoning); Hagood v. Southern, 1 17 U.S.
52, 64-65 (1886) (similar). By contrast, the Court would decide the questions at issue in those
cases when a taxpayer who had tendered the coupons presented a claim, particularly if he
had suffered a seizure of property after the tender. See, e.g. , Poindexter v. Greenhow, 1 14
U.S. 270 (1884).
140. 262

U.S. 447 (1923).

141. See, e.g. , Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 1009-10 (treating Frothingham as an
innovation); Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1444-45 (arguing that while
"Frothingham makes historical sense as a case about the availability of an equitable
remedy," it "raised constitutional considerations that helped lead to a modern conception of
standing"); id. at 1376-77 (suggesting that to the extent Frothingham saw a constitutional
dimension to standing, it had no nineteenth-century support).
142. See Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 483-85.
143. Id. at 485.
144. Id. at 486-89; see also Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922) (indicating that
"the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered
according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted" is not a private litigable interest
of the sort that will support a "Case" within the meaning of Article III).
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interests and creating causes of action that were unknown at common
law. Some critics of modern standing doctrine. see this power as
sufficiently far-reaching that the legislature, if it so desires, can give
each citizen a litigable interest in the legality of governmental action.
Cass Sunstein, indeed, suggests that there was a determinate original
understanding on this point: "[F]rom the founding era to roughly
1920[,] . . . [n]o one believed that the Constitution limited Congress'
power to confer a cause of action. "145
This suggestion of consensus is wrong.146 To be sure, early qui tam
statutes do provide some support to Professor Sunstein's position. As
we explain below, however, that support is weaker than critics of
modern standing doctrine suggest. At the same time, other historical

145. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 170.
146. Professor Sunstein seeks support for his suggestion from the well-accepted
distinction between real-world harms (damna) and invasions of legal rights (injuriae). See id.
at 170-71 ; see also Fletcher, supra note 12, at 249; Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at
1397. As Professor Sunstein observes, these are distinct concepts; the legal system inevitably
makes choices about which real-world interests to protect, and it is quite possible to suffer
damnum absque injuria (harm without an actionable wrong). With this point established,
Professor Sunstein slides quickly to the conclusion that injuria - the invasion of a legal right
- has traditionally been the essential prerequisite for private litigation. See Sunstein, What's
Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 171. In fact, however, there is considerable historical
support for the proposition that private suits will not lie for injuria absque damno any more
than they will lie for damnum absque injuria. See, e.g., Cable v. Rogers, 81 Eng. Rep. 259,
259 (K.B. 1625) (Dodderidge, J.) ("[I]njuria and damnum are the two grounds for the having
all actions . . . : if there be damnum absque injuria, or injuria absque damno, no action
lieth . . . . "); Ashby v. White, 87 Eng. Rep. 810, 810-11 (K.B. 1703) (Gould, P.J.) ("[A]n
injuria sine damna . . . will not bear an action, for both must necessarily concur to maintain
the action; for things must not only be done amiss, but it must redound to the prejudice of
him that will bring his action for it."); Lynn Corp. v. London Corp., 100 Eng. Rep. 933, 939
(K.B. 1791) (Kenyon, C.J.) ("[I]t is against the general principles of the law that a party, who
has not received any injury, should compel another to answer him in a Court of Justice.").
Admittedly, there is historical support for the contrary proposition too. Two of the three
decisions just cited were reversed by the House of Lords, albeit without any broad
statements telling courts to entertain actions for injuria without regard to damnum. See
London Corp. v. Lynn Corp., 101 Eng. Rep. 822 (H.L. 1796) (indicating that the Corporation
of London could seek what amounted to a declaratory judgment about the right of its
freemen to be exempt from tolls and port duties imposed by other municipalities); Ashby v.
White, 1 Eng. Rep. 417, 418 (H.L. 1704) (permitting plaintiff to "recover his damages
assessed by the jury" in his lawsuit against a local sheriff for maliciously and wrongfully
refusing to let him vote in an election for Parliament). Early American authorities,
moreover, can be cited on both sides of this question. Compare Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co.,
29 F. Cas. 506, 507-08 (C.C.D. Me. 1838) (No. 17,322) (Story, J.) (criticizing English
authorities who continued to maintain "that injuria sine damno is not actionable," though
doing so in the context of a controversy that plainly would satisfy the modern Court's
requirement of injury in fact), with JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
AGENCY § 236 (Boston, Little & Brown 1839) (endorsing the view that "to maintain an
action, both [wrong and damage] must concur; for damnum absque injuria, and injuria
absque damno, are equally objections to any recovery"), and 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW
DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 636 (4th ed. 1852)
("Injury without damage or loss will not bear an action."). Still, the modern Supreme Court
certainly is not flying in the face of some well-settled historical understanding when it
suggests that both injuria and damnum are necessary for private litigation.
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evidence casts doubt upon the idea that statutory rights to sue
automatically sufficed to create constitutional " Cases" or
"Controversies," regardless of the real-world interests at stake. We do
not claim that modern standing doctrine sprang fully formed from the
Philadelphia Convention or that the constitutional nature of standing
was universally appreciated from day one. But neither is the opposite
true; the public/private distinction upon which modern standing
doctrine rests does have historical support, and the notion that the
Constitution incorporates that distinction even as against Congress
does not contradict any determinate original understanding.
A.

Evidence of L imits on Legislative Power to Confer Standing

Again, we can start by considering the nineteenth-century Court's
treatment of suits brought in its original jurisdiction. As we have seen,
the Court's opinions frequently suggested that only certain kinds of
interests - "rights of persons or property" - would support private
litigation in federal court.147 These opinions, moreover, gave few
indications that a statutory right to sue would automatically supply the
necessary private interest. To the contrary, when states tried to
legislate to themselves causes of action - as New York and New
Hampshire did in attempting to enforce their citizens' debt claims in
the Supreme Court - the Court was unimpressed. Even with a
statutory right to sue, the states still lacked real-world interests of the
sort that would support litigation, and hence they were not parties to a
cognizable case.148
In other respects too, the Court has traditionally held that
whatever pleading rules or local statutes might say, the constitutional
concept of a "Case" or " Controversy" focuses on the underlying
interests that are genuinely at stake. In Browne v. Strode,149 for
instance, the Marshall Court focused on the concrete interests at stake
to conclude that a particular suit was a "Controversy" between a
citizen of Virginia and a British subject even though the parties of
record were all citizens of the same state.150 This approach was not
147. See supra text accompanying notes 123 and 127-128; see also supra note 133.
148. See supra note 135 and accompanying text; see also Woolhandler & Collins, supra
note 1 17, at 443 n.216 (indicating that states generally had legislative authorization before
suing in the Supreme Court).
149. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).
150. See id. at 303; see also Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61,
68 (1809) (argument of counsel) ("The constitution does not speak of the name on record[,]
of the nominal party; it speaks of 'controversies' . . . . The question is not, what names appear
upon the record, but between whom is the controversy; who are the real litigants.").
Statements of this sort might seem inconsistent with Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). There, the Court held that the Bank's suit against some
individual officers of the State of Ohio, seeking to restrain their execution of an
unconstitutional state statute, was not a "suit . . . commenced or prosecuted against [a state]"
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simply an excuse for extending federal jurisdiction; federal courts used
the same interpretation of Article III to reject jurisdiction when the
underlying interests at stake belonged to citizens of the same state.151
Similar logic undergirded the Marshall Court's conclusion that O wings
v. Norwood's Lessee,152 an ejectment suit brought from state court, was
not a "Case[] . . . arising under . . . [a] Treat[y]" within the meaning of
Article III and hence did not lie within its appellate jurisdiction.
Although the defendant had argued that the plaintiff's claimed title
rested on a state's violation of a treaty, and although this argument {if
true) would have defeated the plaintiff's right to ejectment under state
law, the defendant was not claiming that the treaty protected his own
right to the land; the Supreme Court therefore concluded that the
"Case" between the plaintiff and the defendant did not arise under the
treaty.153
Admittedly, these early decisions are only suggestive; they read
Article III to incorporate a notion of proper parties (defined in terms
of real-world interests), but they did not involve congressional
attempts to confer standing. Conclusions on that issue are necessarily
inferential, because the nineteenth-century Supreme Court rarely
faced federal statutes purporting to authorize private plaintiffs to sue
governmental parties without the traditional accoutrements of a suit.
But in 1911, when the Court squarely confronted such a statute in
Muskrat v. United States,154 it held the suit-authorizing legislation
invalid. A 1902 federal statute had entitled everyone who was a citizen
of the Cherokee Nation on September 1, 1902, to share in the
distribution of Cherokee lands and funds.155 In 1906, Congress adopted
a new statute restricting the property rights that were being distrib-

within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. In explaining this conclusion, Chief Justice
Marshall delivered a broad dictum "that, in all cases where jurisdiction depends on the party,
it is the party named in the record." Id. at 857. All that Osborn really held, however, was
that a genuine "Controversy" existed between the Bank and the individual state officers and
that the state itself was not an indispensable party to a suit seeking to restrain the officers'
conduct. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 846-47, 858-59; see also In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443,
487-88 (1887) (taking this view of Osborn). Later Supreme Court decisions therefore
continued to apply the rule of Browne v. Strode. See, e.g., McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.)
9, 14 (1844) (reaffirming Browne v. Strode and asserting that Article III "look[s] to things
not names - to the actors in controversies and suits, not to the mere forms or inactive
instruments used in conducting them, in virtue of some positive law").
151. See Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (holding that
an ejectment action in which the real parties in interest were citizens of the same state did
not trigger diversity jurisdiction even if the nominal plaintiff was a lessee from a different
state, because the constitutional concept of a "Controversy" focused on the parties whose
litigable interests were genuinely at stake).
152. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344 (1809).
153. See id. at 347-48.
154. 219 U.S. 346 (191 1).
155. See Act effective July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 716.
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uted and permitting people born after 1902 to participate in the
distribution. Concerned about legal challenges, Congress also
authorized a few people who had been enrolled in the tribe as of 1902
(and who therefore wanted to attack the constitutionality of the new
statute) to seek what amounted to a declaratory judgment against the
United States in the Court of Claims, with an appeal as of right to the
Supreme Court. Despite this explicit statutory authorization, however,
the Supreme Court held that the proceeding was not a "Case" or
"Controversy" within the meaning of Article III, essentially because
Congress had provided for the suit to be brought against the wrong
defendant. Although the United States might have been thought to
have some abstract interest in defending the constitutionality of its
statute, this was not the sort of interest that would support litigation,
even if Congress said that it was.156 As for the people who benefited
from the 1906 statute, they certainly had litigable interests adverse to
the claimants, but those interests were not genuinely at stake; the
private beneficiaries were not before the court and would not be
bound by a judgment declaring the 1906 statute unconstitutional.157
Critics of modern standing doctrine might try to explain Muskrat
as simply demonstrating that Congress cannot authorize people to
seek advisory opinions from federal courts - a principle that the
critics generally accept.158 This response, however, acknowledges that
Congress does not have unfettered power to define the interests that
will support litigation in federal court; to distinguish requests for
advisory opinions from true "Cases" and "Controversies," a court
must distinguish interests that support litigation from those that do
not.159 In any event, the problem in Muskrat
the lack of a proper
-

156. See 219 U.S. at 361 (asserting that "the United States . . . has no interest adverse to
the claimants," and explaining that the suit was not designed "to assert a property right as
against the Government, or to demand compensation for alleged wrongs because of action
upon its part").
157. See id. at 362 (emphasizing that a declaratory j udgment against the United States
"will not conclude private parties, when actual litigation brings to the court the question of
the constitutionality of such legislation"). The private beneficiaries apparently were not the
only possible defendants. The following year, the Court reached the merits in the context of
a suit brought against individual federal officials to enjoin them from performing their duties
under the 1906 statute. See Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 (1912).
158. See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 4, at 2251 n.61; Sunstein, Standing and the
Privatization of Public Law, supra note 5, at 1474 n.206; Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4,
at 1374. But cf Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, supra note 5, at 1479
(arguing that "the question whether an injury is merely ideological or instead legal is one of
positive law; there is no pre- or post-legal metric for distinguishing between the two").
159. Suppose, for instance, that Congress passed a statute giving people a legal right to
avoid psychological unease caused by uncertainty about the meaning of the U.S.
Constitution, and providing that two people who disagree about the Constitution's meaning
can sue each other in federal court for a declaratory j udgment about who is correct. It seems
highly doubtful that such a statute, purporting to give each side a personal right to the
resolution of uncertainty, would suffice to transform an otherwise abstract dispute into a
constitutional case. Cf, e.g. , Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411 note (1792) (reprinting
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defendant - is normally thought of as a standing issue, currently
embodied in the requirements of causation and redressability.160
One might be tempted to respond that having an improper
defendant - that is, a defendant against whom one cannot obtain
redress for the violation of a duty (no matter to whom owed) presents a different question than having a plaintiff whose private
interests will be unaffected by a decree. But whether one casts the
problem in terms of standing or in terms of the constitutional bar on
advisory (or nonbinding) op1mons, concerns about improper
defendants are closely related to concerns about improper plaintiffs.
Even critics of modern standing doctrine concede that to have a
constitutional "Case" or "Controversy," both sides must have
cognizable interests at stake.161 For an interest to be genuinely at
stake, moreover, the court's decision must be binding on its owner in
the event the other side wins.162 And for private parties, the
nineteenth-century Court repeatedly indicated that the requisite sorts
of interests were at stake " only where the rights of persons or property
are involved."163
To be sure, the government can maintain litigation over public
rights that do not fit that description. The public's interest in punishing
criminal behavior, for instance, is an interest capable of supporting
litigation in federal court. 164 For a public right of this sort to be
genuinely at stake, however, the public must itself be party to the case
in such a way as to be bound by the resulting judgment, in the sense
that a judgment for the other side would bar the government from
relitigating the same claim. When a private plaintiff who lacks
authority to bind the public is proceeding in his own right, this
condition is not satisfied. In such situations, the plaintiff needs to have
a private interest of his or her own to litigate; otherwise, no sufficient
interest will be at stake on the plaintiff's side, and the clash of interests
necessary for a "Case" or "Controversy" will not exist.
letters indicating that the mere existence of a statutory right to come to court does not
automatically mean that rights of person or property are at stake in the sense necessary to
support a constitutional case).
160. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("A plaintiff must allege
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.").
161. See, e.g. , Richard A. Epstein, Standing in Law & Equity: A Defense of Citizen and
Taxpayer Suits, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 17, 18 (2002) (acknowledging that a "Case" or
"Controversy" requires the existence of "two parties with adverse interests").
162. See Marshall, supra note 31, at 96 (noting that in order to have a "Case" within the
meaning of Article III, "[t]here must be parties to come into court, who can be reached by
its process, and bound by its power; whose rights admit of ultimate decision by a tribunal to
which they are bound to submit").
163. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Hartnett's emphasis
on this point).
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Critics of standing doctrine suggest that Congress can always
create the necessary private interest simply by declaring that each
individual has a personal legal right to avoid his or her share of a
diffuse harm to the public as a whole. To the extent that a defendant's
conduct really does impose some concrete personal harm on each
individual member of society, the Supreme Court has no objection to
this point.165 As the Court's doctrine suggests, however, not all public
rights lend themselves to this sort of disaggregation; for instance, a
citizen's naked interest in a government official's compliance with the
law will not suffice. The mere fact that Congress says an individual has
a private litigable interest in such a dispute, moreover, does not
automatically make it so. As we have seen, there is considerable
historical support for the view that a private lawsuit is not a "Case" or
" Controversy" unless certain kinds of real-world interests are at
stake,166 and there is little historical support for the notion that each
individual citizen can always be given a private litigable interest in
avoiding diffuse harms to the public as a whole.167
Critics also suggest that even if Congress cannot always get around
standing doctrine by giving individuals private interests in formerly
public rights, Congress can simply authorize individuals to litigate on
behalf of the public, thereby latching onto the public's ability to bring
suit over diffuse public rights. But if a loss by the private individual
would not bar relitigation of the polity's right by others, then that right
is not really at stake in such a way as to form the basis for a case. It is
far from clear, moreover, that Congress has the power to remedy this
problem by authorizing private citizens to represent the public in
165. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 1 1 (1998).
166. See supra notes 148-153 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
note 159 (suggesting that under the contrary view, Congress would be able to authorize
federal courts to issue what amount to "advisory opinions"). Critics of modern standing
doctrine correctly observe that in order to apply this idea, courts must distinguish between
the sorts of real-world interests that are capable of supporting private litigation ("rights of
persons or property") and other sorts of real-world interests that are not capable of
supporting litigation (such as outrage at the mere thought of law-breaking by governmental
officials). To thoroughgoing positivists, this distinction is bound to seem arbitrary. See, e.g. ,
Fletcher, supra note 12, at 233 (correctly noting that modern standing doctrine rests on the
same kind of judicial categorization of harms as old forms of substantive due process);
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 1 91 (same). Indeed, even those of us
willing to take guidance from common law traditions will surely be unable to draw
completely satisfactory lines. Still, the fact that modem standing doctrine requires such line
drawing does not call its historical bona fides into question; earlier generations of Americans
would not have recoiled at the notion of what Professor Sunstein calls "prelegal 'injuries.' "
See Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization ofPublic Law, supra note 5, at 1451.
167. For instance, there is no historical tradition of statutes giving each private citizen an
independent right to bring suit on his own behalf over such harms, unaffected by judgments
rendered in any other private citizen's suit over the same harms. Even qui tam actions are no
exception to this principle. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 162 (noting that
the judgment secured by the first qui tam relator, whether he won or lost, was "a bar to all
others, and conclusive even to the king himself").
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court, such that the whole polity will be bound by whatever judgment
the first "citizen suit" produces. Even if one could otherwise read this
sort of power into the Necessary and Proper Clause,168 scholars have
pointed out that the Appointments Clause of Article II may restrict
Congress's ability to set up shadow governments to enforce public
rights.169 The Supreme Court has suggested that only "Officers of the
United States" can be authorized to "conduct[] civil litigation in the
courts of the United States for vindicating public rights,"170 and neither
self-appointment nor appointment by Congress is among the
constitutionally permissible methods for the selection of such
officers.171
B.

What Does the History of Qui Tam Statutes Tell Us?

For critics of standing doctrine, the history of qui tam statutes
decisively refutes arguments that Congress may not delegate to private
individuals the right to litigate on behalf of the public. In England,
when a statute defined a public duty and prescribed a monetary

168. Cf Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 297 (1993) (arguing
that separation-of-powers concerns restrict the kinds of laws that are "proper" within the
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 351-52 (2002) (interpreting Articles I and II to keep Congress
from authorizing private attorneys general to enforce federal law).
169. Professor Hartnett, whose discussion of federal criminal prosecutions we have
invoked above, does not reject this possibility. To the contrary, he concludes that "what is
truly at stake in current standing doctrine is not the meaning of Article III, but the meaning
of Article II," and that the key question is "Who can constitutionally be empowered to
represent such public interests in court?" Hartnett, supra note 4, at 2256, 2258; see also id. at
2257 ("I do not attempt to resolve that debate, or even to enter into it."). We agree with
Professor Hartnett that this is one of the central questions of standing doctrine, although we
are of two minds about localizing it in Article II; one of us (Nelson) largely accepts
Hartnett's way of framing the issue, while the other (Woolhandler) sees more independent
work for Article III to do and resists reducing separation-of-powers issues to the analysis of
any one article.
170. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (per curiam).
171. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. One can accept this argument even if one does not
embrace more extreme views of the "unitary executive," under which all exercises of the
federal government's "executive" power must be under the supervision and control of the
President. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1 153 (1992) (deriving this view from the
Vesting and Take Care Clauses of Article II); Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of
Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (1993) (concluding that
"Article II prohibits Congress from vesting in private parties the power to bring
enforcement actions on behalf of the public without allowing for sufficient executive control
over the litigation"); see also Robin Kundis Craig, Will Separation of Powers Challenges
"Take Care" of Environmental Citizen Suits? Article II, Injury-in-Fact, Private "Enforcers, "
and Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 93, 159-68 (2001) (agreeing that
the executive branch needs to be in charge of "the enforcement of public rights," though
noting that Congress can let plaintiffs who have suffered "private injury" bring suit over
violations of federal environmental statutes (emphasis omitted)).
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penalty for its breach, the whole penalty ordinarily was assumed to be
payable to the crown.172 But Parliament sometimes specifically
provided that a private informer who brought suit upon the statute
could share in the judgment, with part of the penalty going to him and
the balance going either to the crown's general revenues or to some
other public purpose identified by the statute. Suits of this sort were
called qui tam actions.173
From the sixteenth century on, qui tam statutes and the informers
who used them were generating substantial criticism.174 Still, like
private prosecution more generally, the qui tam mechanism made its
way across the Atlantic to the American colonies. Unlike other forms
of private prosecution, moreover, this device can claim some support
from early federal practice: the First Congress enacted a handful of
qui tam statutes, and a few more followed in subsequent years.175
Critics of standing doctrine properly emphasize these statutes as
telling evidence for their position.176
Although the early qui tam statutes do not undercut our claim that
the public was the only proper plaintiff to litigate diffuse harms to the
public as a whole, 177 they undoubtedly support the notion that

172. See 'ESPINASSE, supra note 19, at 8-10; see also, e.g. , Fleming v. Bailey, 102 Eng.
Rep. 1090, 1091 (K.B. 1804) (Ellenborough, C.J.) ("A common informer can have no right
to sue for any penalty, but where power is given to him for that purpose by the statute.").
173. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160 (noting that the informer was
someone "qui tam pro domino rege . . . quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur"
who acts as
much for the lord the king as for himself). On occasion, indeed, Parliament provided that the
informer who launched the suit could keep the entire penalty. Suits under such statutes were
sometimes called "popular" actions, id. , but we will lump them together with regular qui
tam suits.
-

174. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 573-89 (2000) (cataloguing complaints); see also id. at 589608 (noting that after a period in which Parliament enacted few new qui tam statutes,
Parliament returned to the device in the eighteenth century, but that the device fell out of fa
vor again in the nineteenth century). Qui tam actions have now been "expelled from English
law." Id. at 608 (discussing the Common Informers Act of 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 39).
175. See Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381,
387 & n.37 (providing citations).
176. See, e.g. , Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 176 (arguing that
early qui tam statutes, and the lack of contemporaneous constitutional objections to them,
operate as "extremely powerful evidence that Article III did not impose constraints on
Congress' power to grant standing to strangers"); Cass R. Sunstein, Article // Revisionism, 92
MICH. L. REV. 131, 135 (1993) (arguing for the same reason that "the historical evidence cuts
very hard against the invocation of Article II"); Steven L. Winter, What if Justice Scalia
Took History and the Rule of Law Seriously?, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 155, 160
(2001) [hereinafter Winter, Justice Scalia J (agreeing that early qui tam actions "give the lie to
the Court's Article III jurisprudence" and "also refute the claim that the Framers intended
to give the President sole and conclusive authority over the enforcement of the laws").
177. See supra note 167 (noting that judgment in a qui tam action bound the public
rather than simply the individual relator); see also, e.g. , Constitutionality of the Qui Tam
Provisions of the False Claims Act, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 207, 222 (1989) (observing
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Congress could authorize private citizens to initiate and conduct
litigation on behalf of the public. But early qui tam statutes do not
settle this point or demonstrate a determinate "original
understanding" of the constitutional separation of powers. Because
American-style separation of powers had never been put into practical
operation before the 1780s, members of the First Congress could not
possibly have grasped all of the questions that it raised, let alone
worked out coherent answers to them. The constitutional text itself
did not fully specify the relationships among the branches of the
federal government, and neither did any canonical political theory to
which all members of the founding generation subscribed.178 At most,
then, the early qui tam statutes provide some legislative precedents
that arguably started the process of "liquidating" the Constitution's
meaning on these debatable points.179
Those precedents, moreover, are far from overwhelming. At the
outset, it is worth noting that the defendants in qui tam actions usually
were private parties rather than governmental officials, and it was in
the latter context that the nineteenth-century Supreme Court most
explicitly referred to the Constitution in restricting the standing of
private parties. Thus, one might start by cabining the relevance of qui
tam: even if federal courts should be more flexible when assessing
statutorily authorized suits against private defendants, the private
rights model might still be appropriate when individual plaintiffs are
asking courts to direct the conduct of governmental officials.180

that qui tam relators "historically were understood to be suing in a representative capacity"
on behalf of the public at large).
178. See, e.g. , Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions
and Practices, 30 WM. & MAR Y L. REV. 211, 213 (1989) ("[B]y the last quarter of the
eighteenth century, no single doctrine using the label of separation of powers had emerged
that could command general assent.").
179. For discussion of the "liquidation" process by which many members of the
founding generation expected the Constitution's indeterminacies to be resolved, see Caleb
Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525-29 (2003).
Note, however, that if members of Congress simply copied the qui tam device unreflectively
from state or English practice, the statutes that they enacted might carry little weight in that
process. See, e.g. , Letter from James Madison to President Monroe (Dec. 27, 1817), in 3
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 54, 55-56 (J.B. Lippincott 1865)
(arguing that early statutes should not be understood to resolve constitutional questions
when "the question of Constitutionality was but slightly, if at all, examined by the [enacting
Congress]"); see also Nelson, supra, at 527-28 (citing additional authorities for the same
point).
180. Cf Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2, at 176-77 (acknowledging
that this distinction is "not entirely implausible" and arguing simply that it does not flow
from Article III, but rather from elsewhere in the Constitution). The distinction noted in the
text is also capable of handling the critics' favorite mandamus case. In Union Pacific
Railroad v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343 (1875), the relators were proceeding against a private railroad
company rather than a governmental entity, and the Supreme Court's dicta were
correspondingly limited. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text (discussing Hall).
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Even as to suits against private defendants, moreover, critics of
standing doctrine have perhaps exaggerated the extent of federal qui
tam litigation. To justify treating qui tam practice as significant
evidence of the original understanding of the Constitution, Professor
Winter asserts that suits brought by qui tam informers under federal
law were "common and ordinary,"181 and indeed that private
enforcement of federal penal statutes was "the norm rather than the
exception."182 This claim, however, seems to rest upon a questionable
reading of a single sentence in an early Marshall Court opinion.183 In
fact, the qui tam statutes adopted by the First Congress gave rise to
little actual litigation,184 and subsequent Congresses rarely used the
device.185
It is true, as the Supreme Court noted in 1905, that " [l]egislation
giving an interest in [a statutory] forfeiture to a common informer has
been frequent in Congressional legislation relating to revenue
cases."186 But while the collection of customs duties was certainly an
important feature of early federal practice, and while early statutes did
offer private informants a share of the penalties that the government
collected from people who sought to evade those duties,187 these

181. Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1409.
182. Winter, Justice Scalia, supra note 176, at 156.
183. Professor Winter's authority is Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805), one
of the very few qui tam cases considered by the Marshall Court. In the course of his opinion
(which read a limitations statute expansively in order to reject the qui tam claim), Chief
Justice Marshall observed that " (a]lmost every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may
be recovered by an action of debt as well as by information . . . . " Adams, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
at 341. For Winter and other critics, this stray sentence is proof that private "action[s] of
debt" to enforce federal penal statutes were routine. This reading rests on the assumption
that public prosecutors could recover statutory penalties only through criminal process, and
hence that the "action(s] of debt" to which Marshall was referring must have been qui tam
suits. See, e.g., Evan Carninker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341,
342 n.3 (1989) (adding bracketed language to render Marshall's sentence as follows: "Almost
every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may be recovered by an action of debt (by qui
tam plaintiffs] as well as by information (by the public prosecutor]"). This assumption,
however, is wrong; federal district attorneys could bring actions of debt to collect statutory
penalties. See, e.g., United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No.
16,750); United States v. Allen, 24 F. Cas. 772 (C.C.D. Conn. 1810) (No. 14,431); see also
Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 542-43 (1871) (noting the settled rule
"that debt will lie, at the suit of the United States, to recover the penalties and forfeitures
imposed by statutes"). Thus, Marshall's opinion in Adams says nothing to suggest that qui
tam actions were widespread in the federal courts of the early Republic.
184. See Beck, supra note 174, at 541-42; see also id. at 542 n.8 (reporting the
infrequency with which the phrase "qui tam" appears in Westlaw's "ALLFEDS-OLD"
database).
185. See Bales, supra note 175, at 387.
186. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) (rejecting a federal constitutional
challenge to a state law that authorized "proceedings in the nature of qui tam actions").
187. See, e.g., Collection Act of 1799, § 91, 1 Stat. 627, 697; Collection Act of 1789,§ 38,
1 Stat. 29, 48.
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statutes are not important examples of qui tam practice at the federal
level. For the most part, the early Collection Acts simply provided for
private informers to receive a financial reward after the official
collector of customs successfully brought suit upon their
information.188
To the extent that qui tam practice seems entrenched in federal
law, it is mostly because of a single statute.189 Although it was enacted
during the Civil War, the qui tam provision in the federal False Claims
Act produced little litigation before 1930.190 Indeed, when a brief
wavelet of suits arose between 1930 and 1943, Congress responded
with statutory amendments that "all but eliminated the use of the
FCA qui tam."191 As a result of amendments adopted in 1986,
188. The first Collection Act made this arrangement clear:
[A]ll penalties accruing by any breach of this act, shall be sued for and recovered with
costs of suit, in the name of the United States, . . . by the collector of the district where
the same accrued, and not otherwise, unless in cases of penalty relating to an officer of
the customs; and such collector shall be, and hereby is authorized and directed to sue for
and prosecute the same to effect, and to distribute and pay the sum recovered . . .
according to law.
Collection Act of 1789, § 36, 1 Stat. at 47. Later statutes, though less explicit, seem to have
continued this practice. See Collection Act of 1799, § 89, 1 Stat. at 695; see also United States
v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 290 (1825) (discussing this statute and noting that "[i]t is
made the duty of the Collector to prosecute").
Under the Collection Acts, the collector himself also received a portion of the recovery
generated by suits that he prosecuted for the government. See Collection Act of 1799, § 91, 1
Stat. at 697 (providing for half of the recovery to go to the federal Treasury and the balance
to be divided among the collector, certain other enforcement officers, and any informer);
Collection Act of 1789,§ 38, 1 Stat. at 48. This arrangement looks odd to modem eyes, but it
operated as part of the collector's compensation; it was common in the early Republic for
government officials to be paid from fees generated by their work. See LEONARD D. WHITE,
THE FEDERALISTS 406, 413 (1948) (noting that the U.S. Attorneys and Marshals were paid
by fees); LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS 388 (1951) (indicating that many federal
law-enforcement officials continued to be paid by fees). As the Supreme Court made clear,
the collector who prosecuted suits for statutory penalties was doing so "as the agent of the
government" rather than as a private citizen. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 290. Vesting the
collector with authority to conduct litigation on behalf of the American people, moreover,
raises no constitutional problems; the collector was a purely executive officer "subject to the
authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, who may direct the prosecution to cease." Id. In a
conscious departure from English practice, indeed, the Supreme Court held that the
Secretary of the Treasury could remit the statutory penalties at any stage of the litigation,
thereby releasing the share that would have gone to the collector as well as the share that
would have gone to the Treasury. See id. at 290-92; see also id. at 302 (Johnson, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the losing side's "attempt to modify the operation of our laws, and to
regulate the rights and powers of our officers, by some fancied analogy with the British laws
of trade, and British revenue officers").
189. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 &
n.1 (2000) (noting that the U.S. Code contains "[t)hree other qui tam statutes," but that the
qui tam provision in the False Claims Act is "the most frequently used"); Valerie R. Park,
Note, The False Claims Act, Qui Tam Relators, and the Government: Which is the Real Party
to the Action?, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1991) (agreeing that "the only significant
federal qui tam provision" is the one in the False Claims Act).
190. See Bales, supra note 175, at 389.
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however, qui tam actions under the False Claims Act have become a
significant part of federal practice.192
A constitutional challenge to the False Claims Act recently
reached the Supreme Court, and the Court largely ducked. As
analyzed by the Court, the Act's qui tam provisions do two things:
they make the private relator "the statutorily designated agent of the
United States" (with respect to the portion of the recovery that will go
to the Treasury) and they partially assign to him a chose in action
previously owned in full by the government (with respect to the
portion of the recovery that the relator gets to keep).193 The Court
held that if Congress has the power to do these things, then the
resulting suits can proceed in federal court; the public certainly has
standing to seek to recover public money that defendants obtained by
fraud, and someone suing pursuant to a valid assignment can benefit
from the assignor's standing. 194 But the Court explicitly reserved
judgment as to whether Congress can authorize private citizens to act
as attorneys in fact for the public, or can seek to achieve the same
result by purporting to effect a "partial assignment" of the
government's claims to a private individual.195 As one might infer from
the Court's willingness to leave this question open, the qui tam
statutes passed by the early Congresses were neither so numerous nor
so significant as to settle the constitutionality of federal qui tam
provisions.
In any event, even if historical practice really did compel the Court
to uphold the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, and even if
the Court were to extend this conclusion to other qui tam provisions
too, 196 the lessons of qui tam would still be limited. The history of qui
tam runs counter to the tradition of public control over public rights a tradition that, particularly at the federal level, has been far more
191. Id. at 389-90.
192. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL L. REV. 1, 48 (2002) ("Before 1986,
the DOJ received about six qui tam cases per year. Since the 1986 amendments went into
effect, and through October 30, 2000, 3326 qui tam cases have been filed and $4.024 billion
has been recovered.").
193. See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 772-73.
194. See id. at 773-74.
195. See id. at 778 n.8 (reserving judgment about whether the qui tam provisions of the
False Claims Act violate the constitutional relationship between Congress and the executive
branch, which is normally in charge of litigation on behalf of the public).
196. Special provisions in the False Claims Act give the executive branch somewhat
more control over the statutory qui tam actions than public officers in England traditionally
enjoyed. See, e.g. , Bales, supra note 175, at 392-95 (discussing statutory provisions permitting
the Department of Justice to intervene, and noting that " (t)he DOJ, once it has intervened,
may end the litigation or limit the participation of the informer in several ways").
Proprietary interests of the sort covered by the False Claims Act, moreover, may be more
assignable than other sorts of interests that the government can bring suit to protect. See
Gilles, supra note 8, at 341-45 (drawing this distinction).
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prominent than qui tam. Faced with these competing claims from
history, the Court could sensibly conclude that the historical lineage of
qui tam protects qui tam itself, but not other statutory arrangements
that lack the same pedigree. One can portray qui tam practice as a
decisive blow to modern standing doctrine only if one considers the
logic of the law so inexorable that any counterexample to the general
requirement of private injury "proves" that the Constitution has been
understood to impose no such requirement at all.197
For critics of modern standing doctrine, moreover, qui tam is a
double-edged sword. Although it is the primary historical poster child
for private litigation of public rights, it is hardly an attractive one;
there are obvious dangers in a system that permits prosecutorial
discretion to reside in each of 250 million autonomous decisionmakers
who are self-appointed and out for their own financial gain. Perhaps
not surprisingly, then, qui tam practice manifested the problems that
led to the rejection of private criminal prosecution and the more
general limitations on private pursuit of public rights. As early as the
sixteenth century, Sir Edward Coke noted that some informers were
"viperous vermin" who had used qui tam statutes "to vex and
depauperize the subject . . . for malice or private ends, and never for
love of justice."198 In the United States, state courts recognized the
penal nature of qui tam statutes and strictly construed those that came
before them.199 According to one lawyer, indeed, "[qjui tam actions
are judged with great jealousy, because the plaintiff does not seek to
recover anything that he has lost, nor to redress any individual wrong,
but only to expose the faults of his neighbor and turn them to his own
profit. "200
197. Cf Bellia, supra note 102, at 818 ("If historical practice is to be our guide, we must
acknowledge not only its allowances, but its limitations as well."). To bring this point into
sharper focus, it helps to ask whether the critics of standing jurisprudence would
acknowledge any limits on lessons of qui tam. Suppose, for instance, that Congress went
from authorizing qui tam suits to authorizing other forms of private prosecution: any
"private attorney general" who believed that a federal criminal statute had been violated
could seek an indictment and conduct the prosecution of the suspected offender, in the
hopes of collecting a cash bounty for a successful prosecution. Would the logic of qui tam
inevitably defeat all constitutional objections to such a scheme? Or would people come to
agree that qui tam is at best an anomaly, and that the existence of one historically grounded
exception to a general principle of constitutional law does not require repudiation of the
entire principle?
198. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *194, cited in Beck, supra note 174, at 578.
199. See, e.g. , Leonard v. Bosworth, 4 Conn. 421, 424 (1822); Melody v. Reab, 4 Mass.
471, 473 (1808); Washburn v. M'Inroy, 7 Johns. 134, 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
200. Vaughn v. McQueen, 9 Mo. 330, 331 (1845) (argument of counsel). In Vaughn
itself, the court was unwilling to construe the statute as narrowly as counsel wanted, but it
did not reject the principle of strict construction. See also Taft v. Stephens Lith. & E ng. Co.,
38 F. 28, 29 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1889) ("Plaintiff is not suing for the value of his services, or for
injury to his property, but simply to make profit to himself out of the wrongs of others; and
when a man comes in as an informer, and in that attitude alone asks to have a half million
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As for the federal level, private qui tam actions were relatively
rare. But even governmental officials who sought their moieties
caused problems by attempting to pursue actions after higher-level
officials (moved to mercy by the absence of willful violations) had
remitted penalties.201 This historical experience tends to bear out the
work of modern law and economics scholars who suggest that offering
bounties for law enforcement will lead to over-enforcement.202 Such
modern analyses reinforce traditional concerns that private discretion
over public rights would enhance the chances for the arbitrary exercise
of power.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to show that standing doctrine has a far
longer history than its modern critics concede. That history, moreover,
casts concerns about standing in a far more sympathetic light than
most modern-day discussions suggest. Standing doctrines not only
placed decisions about public rights in the hands of politically
accountable officers, but often operated to protect individual citizens
against inequitable enforcement of the law by private adventurers.
Standing doctrine has many dimensions. One focus is on the
particular parties before the court, and whether the rights that they
are invoking are really theirs to control. When discretion to pursue a
claim properly belongs to a private person who has not been made a
party to the action, standing doctrine operates to protect that person
against usurpation of his or her rights. Conversely, rules that preclude
enforcement of public rights by private citizens operate to protect the

dollars put into his pocket, the courts will never strain a point to make his labors light, or his
recovery easy.").
201. See, e.g. , United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246 (1825) (holding that the
collector and surveyor of Portlai!d, Maine, were not entitled to their moiety after the
Treasury Secretary's statutorily authorized determination to remit the fine for lack of willful
negligence or intention to defraud). The Court was concerned that the executive maintain
control over public rights and that the objects of enforcement receive relief for excusable
violations. See id. at 291, 296; see also id. at 302-03 (Johnson, J., concurring). Justice Johnson
noted that he had seen many similar cases on circuit. Id. at 296; see also The Laura, 1 14 U.S.
411 (1885) (holding that where a statute empowered the Secretary to remit fines, the right of
the informer was inchoate and subject to the Secretary's power of remission before the right
was ascertained and established by the court).
202 See Landes & Posner, supra note 16, at 15, 38 (responding to Gary S. Becker &
George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974), which recommended private enforcement of criminal law). Landes
and Posner surmised that where there was incomplete apprehension, a legislature might set a
fine higher than social costs of the activity to minimize enforcement costs. Such enhanced
fines, however, would lead private prosecutors to devote more resources to apprehension.
See id. at 15. Prosecutors motivated by the prospect of financial gain will also have little
interest in reining in the penal law's tendency toward overbreadth. See id. at 38.
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political process and to prevent dissenting individuals from making
end runs around it.
At the same time, the issue of standing necessarily implicates the
proper role of the judiciary in a democratic government and the
relationship between that government and individual defendants.
Exercise of judicial power at the instance of an improper plaintiff risks
injecting the judiciary prematurely in decisions that are not its to
make. By the same token, defendants have interests in freedom from
judicial coercion at the instance of a private citizen who has no private
rights at stake.
Because of the multidimensionality of standing disputes, standing
doctrine implicates not only Article III but also a variety of other
constitutional concerns, including the relationships among all three
branches of the federal government, the relationship between the
federal government and the states, and the demands of due process.203
That there may be many ways to restate a standing problem perhaps
manifests the fundamental nature, in a regime of limited government,
of the distinction between public and private rights.
Standing critics speak in glowing terms about the desirability of
allowing private citizens to litigate public rights. In the words of
Professor Winter, " [o]nly this model affirms the ability of the
individual citizen to be heard above the din of pluralistic, self
interested, majoritarian politics, and to participate directly in the
normative process. "204 Our governmental institutions, however, have
developed upon a different premise: the unique advantage of the
courts lies in protecting private rights, not in representing the public
more wisely than the political branches can.

203. Our inclusion of due process in this list might seem peculiar. But at least in modern
times, private prosecution of certain criminal offenses would surely raise some such
concerns. Cf , e.g., State v. Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d 775 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (concluding
that even when a prosecution remains nominally under the control of public officers, the
participation of the victim's civil lawyers as co-counsel violates the Due Process Clause).
Potential due process issues also arise when a private party seeks to litigate the right of
another private person who has not been brought into the proceedings. Thus, concerns
about the absence of "indispensable" parties, or about the res judicata effect of judgments
on absent parties, are often cast in terms of due process.
204. Winter, The Metaphor, supra note 4, at 1508.

